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FREE SPEECH AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
DAN T. COENEN† 
ABSTRACT 
  To what extent does the First Amendment limit the ability of 
prosecutors to offer evidence of a defendant’s past protected speech? 
As it turns out, the Supreme Court has touched on this question in only 
a handful of rulings, each of which was crafted to target only the 
distinctive facts of the case at hand. Many lower courts, however, have 
distilled from these decisions a sweeping, admissibility-favoring 
constitutional rule. According to that rule, the First Amendment 
imposes no limit on prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence—no 
matter how prejudicial—so long as it meets the minimum standard of 
evidentiary relevance. This approach is misguided. To begin with, it has 
no support in the Court’s past decisions, which in fact favor, rather than 
disfavor, a meaningful judicial role in evaluating the use of past-speech 
evidence. Even more important, a hands-off stance clashes with long-
honored free-speech-supporting constitutional policies. As a result, this 
Article calls for judicial recognition of a new set of First Amendment 
protections that operate whenever challenged past-speech evidence 
involves expression on a matter of public concern. This build-out of 
existing doctrine comports with the Court’s specialized protection of 
public-concern speech in a wide variety of settings. It also gains 
momentum from the Court’s jurisprudence regarding constitutional 
review of generally applicable laws—in this case, the generally 
applicable law of evidence. On close examination, the operative 
doctrines in this field—as well as the policy considerations that underlie 
those doctrines—provide strong support for an approach that imposes 
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both procedural and substantive constraints on the use of public-
concern speech to secure criminal convictions. Such an approach is 
offered here. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To what extent does the Free Speech Clause require judges to 
exclude proof of a criminal defendant’s prior statements, otherwise 
admissible under the rules of general evidence law? Assume, for 
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example, that the State seeks to show that the defendant committed 
murder by bombing a government building. Assume also that the 
defendant denies any participation in the crime, but an alleged 
coconspirator says the defendant lit the fuse. To help prove that he did 
so, can the prosecutor offer testimony that the defendant once declared 
himself to be a member of al-Qaeda? That, even if the defendant never 
joined al-Qaeda, he had spoken about the justifiability of Jihad? That 
several weeks earlier he declared in a speech that current national 
policies warranted violent revolution? That hours before the bombing 
he told a friend that the government had become intolerably 
misguided? Each of these items of evidence would tend to show that 
the defendant had a motive to engage in the bombing. As a result, they 
would appear to be relevant and thus admissible under the general law 
of evidence—or at least some judges might so rule. 
The admission of any of these statements, however, would raise 
significant tensions with the First Amendment. Under well-settled 
Free Speech Clause law, after all, the government could not send the 
defendant to jail simply because he made these utterances or because 
of the views or associations these utterances reflect. Yet, revealing any 
one of these statements to the jury might have the same practical effect 
by decisively leading it to convict the defendant of the charged crime. 
Evidence of this kind also invites a finding of guilt based on 
justifications derived directly from the protected content of the 
defendant’s past speech—reasons such as a perceived lack of 
patriotism, political radicalism, or potential for “off the wall” behavior. 
The question thus arises whether a prosecutor’s use of this type of 
evidence—what is called here “past-speech evidence”—offends the 
First Amendment. 
The practical problems posed by the use of past-speech evidence 
are far-reaching. Indeed, prosecutors offer proof of defendants’ past 
statements on a daily basis in their efforts to secure convictions. And 
these prior statements—commonly called “admissions”—routinely 
come into evidence, even though they constitute instances of speech.1 
More subtly, but no less importantly, the analytical issues raised by the 
use of past-speech evidence ripple across major domains of First 
Amendment law. Most notably, these cases simultaneously bring into 
play Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the special protections 
applicable to speech on matters of public concern; the extent to which 
 
 1. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (utilizing the more recent, and more accurate, terminology 
of “[a]n [o]pposing [p]arty’s [s]tatement”). 
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the Free Speech Clause can support as-applied challenges to generally 
applicable laws; and the reach of constitutional limits that stem from 
so-called “First Amendment due process.” It follows that the matters 
considered here both implicate and help illuminate foundational 
features of free-expression-law theory, doctrine, and practice. 
Indeed, issues regarding the Government’s introduction of past-
speech evidence have surfaced in some of the highest-profile cases in 
American history, including the 1921 trial of Sacco and Vanzetti, the 
1951 espionage trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and the 1969 trial 
of the Chicago Eight.2 Perhaps for this reason, analysts have suggested 
that controversies over past-speech evidence most often arise in times 
of “political tension.”3 Political tension, however, is a recurring 
component of the American experience, fueled by such matters as anti-
war protests, labor-related and other counterculture movements, 
conflicts rooted in religious dissent, and the ever-churning challenges 
stirred by our nation’s racial divisions. In recent years, for example, 
courts have faced challenges to prosecutorial use, as evidence, of rap 
lyrics authored by criminal defendants that are said to celebrate 
violence or drug use.4 
Given these conditions, one might expect that courts and 
commentators would have worked through how evidence law and the 
Free Speech Clause should and do fit together. As it turns out, 
however, only one major scholarly article, written by Professor Peter 
E. Quint, grapples with past-speech-evidence problems, and that piece 
is now more than four decades old.5 In addition, prior judicial 
treatments of these problems are marked by inconsistency and a lack 
of analytical depth.6 One consequence of all of this is that lawyers may 
 
 2. See Peter E. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of 
Evidence: The Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622, 1623 n.4, 1624, 1645 
(1977).  
 3. Id. at 1678. 
 4. See, e.g., Andrea L. Dennis, Poetic (In)justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and 
Criminal Evidence, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2007); Sean-Patrick Wilson, Rap Sheets: The 
Constitutional and Societal Complications Arising from the Use of Rap Lyrics as Evidence at 
Criminal Trials, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 345, 359–64 (2005). 
 5. Quint, supra note 2. Another helpful treatment is Robert P. Faulkner, Evidence of First 
Amendment Activity at Trial: The Articulation of a Higher Evidentiary Standard, 42 UCLA L. 
REV. 1 (1994), though it largely builds on Professor Quint’s earlier work. See also Helen A. 
Anderson, The Freedom to Speak and the Freedom to Listen: The Admissibility of the Criminal 
Defendant’s Taste in Entertainment, 83 OR. L. REV. 899, 902 (2004) (noting that “a criminal 
defendant’s viewing, listening, or reading habits may be used as evidence against that defendant, 
and that the constitutional implications of such evidence are rarely discussed”).  
 6. See Amy Pomerantz Nickerson, Coercive Discovery and the First Amendment: Towards 
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well miss chances to register objections to the introduction of 
potentially excludable past-speech proof or to frame objections in 
proper terms.7 
These dynamics stem in part from another curiosity: the Supreme 
Court has squarely confronted the sort of question considered here in 
only one prior case, Haupt v. United States.8 In the seven decades since 
Haupt, however, free-speech doctrine has undergone a process of all-
but-revolutionary change. This process has engaged the Court in 
building out a host of new speech-protective doctrines—especially for 
speech on “matters of public concern”9—that push in favor of placing 
constitutional limits on the use of past-speech evidence. On the other 
hand, a restraintist approach might—at least at first blush—seem to 
find support in modern precedents that reflect judicial hesitance to 
vindicate as-applied challenges to so-called “generally applicable 
laws.”10 There is, however, a large problem with urging that the 
generally applicable character of evidence law precludes as-applied 
challenges to the introduction of past-speech evidence. The problem is 
that key decisions of the Court—such as Sherbert v. Verner,11 United 
States v. O’Brien,12 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,13 and a host 
of First Amendment due process rulings14—support the making of 
context-specific constitutional challenges to generally applicable laws. 
Moreover, the expression-protective features of these authorities find 
their driving force in policy reasons that carry over in powerful ways to 
past-speech-evidence cases. In sum, both the key authorities and their 
underlying logic suggest that courts are constitutionally required to 
thoughtfully assess the admissibility of past-speech evidence, 
 
a Heightened Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 841, 845 (2010) (noting “doctrinal 
inconsistencies and confusion”). 
 7. See United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting counsel’s failure in 
lodging an objection “to specify exactly what role constitutional considerations should play”); 
Anderson, supra note 5, at 901 (noting that missed opportunities sometimes arise because “the 
law in this area is underdeveloped”); see also United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 751 
(4th Cir. 2011) (requiring that evidentiary objections on constitutional grounds—there, pursuant 
to the Confrontation Clause—be specifically so made).  
 8. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947). 
 9. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 458 (2011). 
 10. See infra notes 107–12 and accompanying text. 
 11. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 12. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 13. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 14. See infra Part III.D. 
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regardless of its relevance, pursuant to a speech-sensitive balancing 
analysis when prosecutors seek to use that evidence at trial. 
This Article develops these ideas in four parts. Part I canvasses the 
Court’s rulings on past-speech evidence, demonstrating that none of 
those rulings, apart from the well-aged decision in Haupt, deals 
squarely with the intersection of the rules of evidence and the Free 
Speech Clause. Part I also explains that despite the contrary views of 
many lower courts, no prior Supreme Court ruling—including Dawson 
v. Delaware15—supports the admission of all relevant past-speech 
evidence regardless of First Amendment considerations.16 Part II goes 
on to show that the Court’s post-Haupt rulings on expression related 
to matters of public concern in fact support placing meaningful 
constitutional limits on the use of past-speech evidence. Part III then 
turns to the Court’s jurisprudence of generally applicable rules and 
demonstrates why that body of law likewise cuts in favor of, rather than 
against, the recognition of such limits. 
Finally, Part IV considers what those limits should be. Drawing on 
precedents crafted in analogous contexts, it posits (1) that trial judges, 
after hearing arguments away from the jury, should have to issue 
reasoned rulings whenever defendants object to prosecutorial use of 
public-concern-related past-speech proof, and (2) that appellate courts 
should subject adverse rulings on such objections to a form of review 
much more exacting than the abuse-of-discretion standard ordinarily 
applied in this set of cases. Part IV goes on to reject a variety of possible 
substantive legal tests for assessing whether past-speech evidence is 
rightly subject to exclusion. The best approach, according to the 
synthesis presented in Part IV, is one that requires courts to weigh 
whether the government’s interest in using any item of such evidence 
outweighs all the costs that introducing it would place on First 
Amendment concerns—with an emphasis on the point that those 
concerns reach much further than others have recognized in the past. 
Embracing this set of rules would, as it ought to, constitutionalize 
evidence law with regard to prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence. 
It is understandable that many trial lawyers, trial courts, and evidence 
law scholars tend to view these cases through the lens of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403. This rule, after all, permits judges to exclude evidence 
that present risks of “unfair prejudice.”17 The doctrine for policing 
 
 15. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992). 
 16. See infra notes 34–35, 41–47, 53–66 and accompanying text. 
 17. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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past-speech evidence proposed in this Article, however, reaches well 
beyond the minimal limits imposed by Rule 403 and the jurisprudence 
that has crystallized around it. And that is as it should be. Precisely 
because past-speech evidence raises specialized First Amendment 
concerns, a specialized set of First Amendment restrictions should 
control its use. 
There is no pretense here that applying these restrictions will 
always be easy. Even more emphatically, there is no suggestion that 
defendants should routinely, or even commonly, succeed when they 
raise Free Speech Clause objections to the use of past-speech proof. If 
core First Amendment values are to receive their fair due, however, 
courts should afford such objections more than an unthinking, wave-
of-the-hand dismissal when public-concern speech is in the picture. 
This Article shows how courts can and should deal more thoughtfully 
with the serious constitutional problems posed by prosecutorial use of 
past-speech evidence. 
I.  THE LAW OF FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON PAST-SPEECH 
EVIDENCE 
Many trials involve the use of past speech as evidence. Most cases, 
however, do not concern the sort of constitutional issues that are the 
subject of this Article. For example, confessions made to police officers 
come in the form of words. But no one would suggest that the Free 
Speech Clause bars the admission of those confessions at trial. Other 
forms of speech-based evidence also fall beyond the scope of this 
Article because they do not, even remotely, involve expression on 
matters of public concern. Illustrative are intercepted crime-planning 
communications (“Let’s meet in an hour to get ready for the bank 
robbery.”) and pre-crime inculpatory statements (“Tomorrow, I’m 
going to kill Mortimer!”). 
Also outside the scope of this Article are three types of cases that 
do involve public-concern-speech evidence. First, some cases involve 
prosecutorial use of past public-concern-related utterances made not 
by the criminal defendant, but by a third-party witness. In these cases, 
any burden placed on the speaker typically is limited. Defense 
witnesses, for example, might experience discomfort when prosecutors 
impeach them based on prior inconsistent statements they made on 
public issues. But any such burden on speech is far removed from a 
criminal conviction of a defendant supported by that defendant’s own 
past pronouncements. 
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Second, in some cases, litigants offer evidence of past speech by a 
government official in seeking civil relief not against that official, but 
(at least in practical effect) against the government itself.18 Courts, for 
example, have considered evidence of President Trump’s pre-election 
statements about Muslims in lawsuits challenging the so-called “travel 
ban.”19 But an effort to secure injunctive relief from a government 
entity—which did not itself previously utter any words—is very 
different from a prosecutor’s use of an individual’s past speech as 
evidence of that very individual’s commission of a crime. Cases of that 
sort, accordingly, are not considered here. 
Finally, past-speech evidence sometimes is offered against 
individual defendants in civil proceedings, including when plaintiffs 
seek monetary relief. It may be that the arguments made here with 
regard to criminal prosecutions should carry over to such cases,20 
especially because the Court often equates civil remedies and criminal 
sanctions when applying First Amendment limits.21 Perhaps, however, 
close analysis will reveal reasons to treat civil and criminal cases 
differently in this context.22 This Article thus leaves it to others to 
explore how the First Amendment bears on the use of evidence in civil 
trials, administrative hearings, and other noncriminal decision-making 
processes. 
 
 18. Among these cases are those in which injunctive relief is nominally, but not functionally, 
sought against a named government official under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908). 
 19. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir.) 
(considering “numerous campaign statements expressing animus towards the Islamic faith”), 
vacated and remanded by 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). In Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), the 
Supreme Court upheld the travel ban but emphasized the special circumstances of the case in 
doing so. See id. at 2418–20. Of particular importance to the Court’s endorsement of a very 
“narrow standard of review” was the origin of the travel restriction in both foreign-affairs-related 
immigration policy and “national security” concerns. Id. at 2419 (citation omitted). Even in this 
context, however, the Court did not disclaim all authority to consider the “plaintiff’s extrinsic 
evidence.” Id. at 2420. For a detailed discussion of the how courts should approach campaign-
speech evidence as a general matter when government motives are at issue, see Michael B. 
Coenen, Campaign Communications and the Problem of Government Motive, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. (forthcoming 2018). 
 20. See Faulkner, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
 21. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964); see also Michael B. Coenen, Of 
Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 991, 993–94 (2012). 
 22. See Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533, 
1563–77 (2017) (developing this idea by highlighting that different forms of sanctions, civil or 
criminal in character, can have a key impact in the application of Free Speech Clause protections). 
See generally Coenen, supra note 21 (developing this differential-sanction concept in detail). 
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In sum, this Article considers only prosecutorial use of public-
concern-related speech made by defendant-declarants. The Supreme 
Court has touched on this subject in several rulings.23 In only three 
cases, however, has it dealt specifically with objections to evidentiary 
use of such speech. And in only one case—Haupt—did the Court 
confront a constitutional challenge to the use of past-speech evidence 
that was deemed relevant to a disputed factual issue. 
A. Haupt v. United States 
The prosecution of Hans Max Haupt, a German-born naturalized 
American citizen, arose out of the surreptitious entry of a group of Nazi 
saboteurs, including Haupt’s son, into the United States during World 
War II.24 The indictment charged Haupt with conspiring to commit 
treason after his son arrived in the country.25 The overt acts said to 
support this allegation included Haupt’s purchase of a car for his son’s 
use, his helping his son get a job in a munitions plant, and his allowing 
his son to live in the family home.26 At trial, Haupt argued that these 
actions were not motivated by a desire to aid the enemy, as the charged 
crime required, but instead by the natural parental impulse to help 
one’s child.27 In response, the Government offered proof, admitted by 
the trial judge, of statements “showing sympathy with Germany and 
with Hitler.”28 In particular, the prosecution proved that Haupt had 
stated “that after the war he intended to return to Germany, that the 
United States was going to be defeated, that he would never permit his 
boy to join the American Army, [and] that he would kill his son before 
he would send him to fight Germany.”29 
On appeal, Haupt argued that the trial court erred in permitting 
the Government to use these statements as evidence against him,30 but 
 
 23. See infra notes 70, 114–21 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 
U.S. 476 (1993)) and note 314 (discussing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); see 
also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948–49 (1983) (deeming the defendant’s proven “desire to 
start a race war” relevant to establishing the aggravating factor of creating a “great risk of death 
to many persons,” but focusing on the defendant’s assertion, unrelated to evidence law, that 
“racial motive” had improperly operated as a “non-statutory aggravating circumstance”).  
 24. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 633 (1947).  
 25. Id. at 633–34. 
 26. Id. at 634. 
 27. Id. at 641. 
 28. Id. at 642. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
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Justice Jackson rejected this argument in an opinion for the Court.31 
Providing only a single-paragraph treatment of the issue, Jackson 
reasoned that “these statements were explicit and clearly were 
admissible on the question of intent and adherence to the enemy” 
because they showed “hostility to the United States.”32 At the same 
time, he observed that “[s]uch testimony is to be scrutinized with care 
to be certain the statements are not expressions of mere lawful and 
permissible difference of opinion with our own government or quite 
proper appreciation of the land of birth.”33 Haupt thus leaves behind 
tricky questions. It is no small problem, after all, to separate statements 
that reflect “hostility to the United States” from statements that reflect 
a mere “difference of opinion with our own government.”34 In addition, 
the Court’s terse analysis cannot fairly be viewed as doing more than 
resolving the discrete evidentiary dispute raised by the facts of the case. 
Haupt does not hold, or even suggest, that the First Amendment never 
blocks prosecutorial use of otherwise relevant evidence, particularly 
under modern-day principles of free-expression law. Indeed, Haupt 
signals—albeit while offering no particularized guidance on this 
point—that the introduction of past-speech evidence “is to be 
scrutinized with care.”35 
B. Post-Haupt Cases 
Several post-Haupt cases touch on the subject of prosecutorial use 
of past-speech evidence—most notably, United States v. Abel36 and 
Dawson v. Delaware.37 But these rulings, like Haupt, fall far short of 
negating all Free Speech Clause limits on the Government’s use of 
relevant past-speech evidence in criminal prosecutions. Indeed, close 
examination shows that they do not signal in any way the propriety of 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. As it turns out, in considering this issue, the majority in Haupt made no express 
reference to the First Amendment. For this reason, some observers might try to claim that the 
case does not involve an application of constitutional principles, as opposed to principles of 
general evidence law. At the very least, however, the Court in its later work has relied on Haupt 
in laying down governing constitutional principles. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 476, 
489–90 (1993). As a result, the analysis set forth here proceeds on the assumption that, under 
authority laid down by the Supreme Court, the admission of the prior-speech evidence in Haupt 
comported with First Amendment requirements. 
 33. Haupt, 330 U.S. at 642.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 46–48 (1984). 
 37. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 160–64 (1992). 
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limiting free-expression rights in this set of cases. Particularly 
unenlightening on this score is the Court’s 1984 ruling in Abel. There, 
in a prosecution for bank robbery, the defendant offered the testimony 
of a witness, Robert Mills, indicating that a third person had tried to 
frame the defendant as a means of escaping punishment for the crime.38 
In response, the Government submitted proof of the membership of 
both the defendant and the defense witness Mills in the Aryan 
Brotherhood, as well as testimony that Brotherhood members were 
sworn to lie on each other’s behalf.39 The Court upheld the trial judge’s 
admission of this evidence, deeming it probative of the witness’s bias 
and resulting lack of credibility.40 
For two separate reasons, Abel is uninformative with regard to the 
matter considered in this Article—that is, the scope of First 
Amendment limits on evidentiary use of a criminal defendant’s prior 
statements. First, that case did not involve a constitutional question at 
all. Rather, the defendant himself proceeded from the assumption 
“that the question is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence”41—
in particular, Rule 403, which provides for the exclusion of relevant 
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger 
of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.”42 
In turn, the Court found no reversible error because the trial court had 
not “abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,”43 
particularly because the “district court is accorded a wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules.”44 
Second, the Court specifically distinguished the ordinary case involving 
past-speech evidence. It emphasized that the “highly probative”45 
proof presented in Abel “was not offered to convict [the defendant 
Abel] of a crime, but to impeach Mills’ testimony.”46 As a result, Abel 
offers no guidance in assessing objections—especially First 
Amendment objections—to past statements made by defendants 
 
 38. Abel, 469 U.S. at 47. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 49. 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 43. Abel, 469 U.S. at 53.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 55.  
 46. Id. at 53. 
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themselves and offered by the prosecution as substantive evidence of 
guilt.47 
The Court’s latest encounter with a free-speech-based evidentiary 
objection came in Dawson v. Delaware. That case concerned a 
sentencing hearing that followed a jury’s finding that the defendant, a 
white man, had committed the murder of a white victim during a 
burglary in the wake of a prison escape.48 At the sentencing hearing, 
the trial judge admitted evidence that the defendant was a member of 
an Aryan Brotherhood gang at the Delaware State Penitentiary as well 
as a stipulation that read in its entirety: “The Aryan Brotherhood 
refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960’s in California 
in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling 
themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons 
including Delaware.”49 On these facts, the Delaware Supreme Court 
upheld the jury’s imposition of the death sentence.50 It acknowledged 
that this evidence did not bear on the three death-sentence-supporting 
aggravating circumstances on which the prosecution had relied—
namely, that the murder was committed (1) by an escaped prisoner, (2) 
during a burglary, and (3) for monetary gain.51 Even so, the state court 
concluded that the evidence tended to establish the defendant’s bad 
character, thus appropriately counterbalancing the defendant’s 
mitigating evidence of good character as shown by his past acts of 
kindness to family members and voluntary participation in drug and 
alcohol rehabilitation programs.52 
Writing for eight members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
overturned the state court ruling on the ground that the challenged 
evidence had “no bearing” on the issues in the case.53 He emphasized 
at the outset “that the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to 
the admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations at 
sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected 
by the First Amendment.”54 In this case, however, the challenged 
evidence lacked significance because the two-sentence stipulation 
 
 47. Accord Faulkner, supra note 5, at 36 n.221 (noting that Abel does not address a First 
Amendment challenge). 
 48. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 160–61 (1992). 
 49. Id. at 162 (citation omitted).  
 50. Id. at 163. 
 51. Id. at 162–63. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 168. 
 54. Id. at 165. 
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about the Aryan Brotherhood provided only minimal information,55 
and because the racist nature of the Brotherhood had no meaningful 
connection to the white-on-white murder.56 The Chief Justice noted 
that “we would have a much different case” if the State had proved 
“that the Aryan Brotherhood is a white racist prison gang that is 
associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and that 
advocates the murder of fellow inmates.”57 On the actual facts, 
however: 
Whatever label is given to the evidence presented, . . . we conclude 
that Dawson’s First Amendment rights were violated by the 
admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence . . . , because the 
evidence proved nothing more than Dawson’s abstract 
beliefs. . . . [O]n the present record one is left with the feeling that the 
Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed simply because the jury 
would find these beliefs morally reprehensible.58 
 Justice Thomas filed a vigorous dissent, reasoning that even 
“abstract beliefs” can be relevant to the issue of “‘bad’ character,” 
which the Court’s past rulings had deemed broadly provable for 
sentencing purposes.59 In addition, he urged that Dawson’s gang 
membership was relevant for reasons that went beyond establishing his 
“‘abstract’ racist ‘beliefs.’”60 In particular, Justice Thomas argued, this 
evidence tended to demonstrate that Dawson “had engaged in some 
sort of forbidden activities while in prison”; to prove his “future 
dangerousness”; and “to rebut [his] attempt to show that he was kind 
to others.”61 Justice Thomas reasoned that jurors could draw on “their 
knowledge of the world” in assessing this evidence, especially because 
“[t]he concept of a prison gang is not so mysterious that it requires an 
encyclopedic definition.”62 
Responding to these observations, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
questioned whether, in fact, “jurors would be familiar with” the nature 
of prison gangs and concluded that the unembellished “Aryan 
Brotherhood evidence . . . cannot be viewed as relevant ‘bad’ character 
 
 55. Id. (noting “the narrowness of the stipulation”). 
 56. Id. at 166. 
 57. Id. at 165. 
 58. Id. at 167 (citation omitted). 
 59. Id. at 176, 178 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 168 (majority opinion)). 
 60. Id. at 171 (quoting id. at 167) (majority opinion). 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. 
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evidence in its own right.”63 For Justice Thomas, however, this line of 
analysis served only to “bend traditional concepts of relevance.”64 And 
this bending, for him, was especially problematic because he viewed 
the majority opinion itself as endorsing the admissibility of past-speech 
evidence so long as it is relevant.65 In fact, however, the Chief Justice 
never embraced that position. Rather, he simply observed that a 
stronger showing of relevance would “have made this a different case” 
and “might have avoided” the constitutional problem the Court had 
detected.66 
The bottom line is that the Court’s three key rulings on speech-
based evidence have not removed—and instead have highlighted—the 
doctrinal indeterminacy that pervades this subject. The Court has set 
forth no legal test for assessing the admissibility of past-speech 
evidence. Nor has it even begun to suggest how this set of cases fits 
within the overarching structure of its now-elaborate free-speech 
jurisprudence. Indeed, as discussed above, only Haupt concerned an 
objection to the admissibility of evidence that the Court viewed (to use 
the words of Dawson) as having some “bearing on the issue being 
tried.”67 Without question, Haupt signals—as Dawson later 
confirmed—“that the Constitution “does not erect a per se barrier” 
against the use of past-speech evidence.68 But this proposition is neither 
controversial nor enlightening as to the key question considered in this 
 
 63. Id. at 168 (majority opinion).  
 64. Id. at 174 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 65. See id. at 179–80. 
 66. Id. at 167–68 (majority opinion). See also, e.g., J. Christopher Naftzger, Note, The 
Admissibility of First Amendment Protected Conduct as an Aggravating Factor in Capital 
Sentencing Trials After Dawson v. Delaware, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343, 363 (1993) 
(“Dawson . . . did little to establish a concrete rule concerning what constitutionally protected 
conduct is admissible as aggravating evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial.”). In 
addition, even Dawson’s pronouncement about the absence of a “per se barrier” was targeted 
only “at sentencing.” Dawson, 503 U.S. at 165. Thus, even if that statement somehow was meant 
to give rise to an admission-friendly, just-show-relevance principle, that principle would not 
necessarily apply to trial (as opposed to sentencing) proceedings, in light of the especially 
generous rules of admissibility that have long been applied in the sentencing context. See, e.g., 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820–21 (1991). Standing this idea on its head, one court has 
raised the possibility that any limit that Dawson imposes on the use of evidence in sentencing 
proceedings might properly be deemed inapplicable to trial proceedings, thus negating the 
operation of the First Amendment altogether in the trial context. Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180, 
185 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996). This suggestion, however, has things exactly backwards, in light of the 
law’s distinctive evidentiary permissiveness in sentencing proceedings. See FED. R. EVID. 
1101(d)(3) (specifying that evidence rules do not apply in sentencing proceedings). 
 67. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168.  
 68. Id. at 165. 
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Article: To what extent does the First Amendment block prosecutorial 
use of a defendant’s past speech at trial, even if it is relevant and 
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence? 
C. The Lower Courts 
Not surprisingly, given the pervasiveness of both communicative 
activity and its routine use by prosecutors as inculpatory proof, lower 
courts have encountered a wide array of cases in which defendants 
raised First Amendment objections to the use of past-speech evidence. 
In response, some courts—especially before Dawson—signaled the 
need for serious-minded consideration of constitutional objections, 
regardless of evidentiary relevance.69 But most courts, especially in 
recent years, have taken a different view, concluding—often based on 
Dawson—that the First Amendment never forecloses the use of past-
speech evidence so long as it is relevant.70 Given the centrality of the 
 
 69. See, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543, n.7 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (excluding evidence because “[i]ts evidentiary value . . . is far outweighed by the 
defendants’ first amendment interests”); U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F. 
Supp. 1155, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (deeming “low probative value” to be “substantially 
outweighed by the defendants’ strong interest in preserving their First Amendment rights”); 
United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (“[I]t is within the 
province of the trial judge to exclude . . . evidence if he finds that it is not probative or is unduly 
prejudicial.”); Ayers v. State, 645 A.2d 22, 39 (Md. 1994) (seeming to deem past-speech evidence 
inadmissible unless “[a]t a minimum” it is “contemporaneous with the crime” or “part of the chain 
of events that led to the crime”); see also United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(recognizing the possibility that there is a need to “plac[e] a thumb” on the Rule 403 scale to 
safeguard “First Amendment concerns”); United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 961 (9th Cir. 
2007) (Kleinfeld, C.J., concurring) (“Barring exceptional circumstances, . . . what people 
read . . . should not be used to prove what they intend to do.”); Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & 
Tr. Co., 641 F.2d 457, 467 (7th Cir. 1981) (excluding evidence under Rule 403 based on “the First 
Amendment right to petition which Noerr-Pennington protects”); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of 
Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Colo. 2002) (applying strict scrutiny in assessing a First 
Amendment objection to a subpoena of a bookstore purchase record without questioning its 
evidentiary relevance); Nickerson, supra note 6, at 864 (noting that “courts have employed a 
variety of multipart tests” that take account of the “defendant’s . . . First Amendment interests” 
in an effort to secure evidence about the identity of people who have made anonymous Internet 
postings). 
 70. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 927 (noting that “many . . . cases . . . reduce the 
constitutional issue to one of relevance”); see e.g., United States v. Rembert, 851 F.3d 836, 838–
39 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that a relevant Facebook video was 
admissible), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 401; United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832, 840–41 (2d Cir. 
2015) (highlighting that the defendant’s First Amendment rights were not implicated when the 
district court found a rap video and tattoos admissible as evidence for the prosecution); United 
States v. Walters, 350 F. App’x 826, 829 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The First Amendment does not bar 
evidence of a person’s associations when it provides a link to criminal activity.”); Dressler v. 
McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with the defendant’s First 
Amendment claim, and highlighting that “the jury was permitted to draw an inference about [the 
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relevance concept to evidence law, these decisions may also suggest a 
sensitivity to the generally applicable character of that law.71 On this 
view, because the basic relevance test of admissibility applies across the 
board to evidence of all kinds, there is no good reason to meddle with 
that rule on constitutional grounds simply because a small number of 
its applications involve the potentially prejudicial use of past-speech 
proof.72 
 
defendant’s] state of mind based on the fact that he maintained a collection of photographs”); 
Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that “Dawson simply requires that 
the evidence be relevant” (citation omitted)); United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1527 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (“A person’s beliefs, superstitions, or affiliation with a religious group is properly 
admissible where probative of an issue in a criminal prosecution.” (citations omitted)); United 
States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 844 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment does not compel 
the exclusion of evidence simply because it consists of speech. If a defendant’s words or his silence 
are relevant to prove some issue in the case, they are admissible subject to the rules of 
evidence . . . .”); State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 446 (Conn. 2003) (holding that even if the 
defendant’s statement constituted protected speech, “[it] was still admissible because it was 
relevant”); State v. Moore, 927 P.2d 1073, 1090 (Or. 1996) (“[U]nder Dawson, the trial court’s 
admission of the evidence at issue here did not violate defendant’s First Amendment rights.”). 
Some lower courts also have found support for this position in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 
(1993), based on the Court’s observation that “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the 
evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.” Id. at 
489. This passage, however, in no way establishes that the First Amendment always requires 
admission of past-speech evidence so long as it is relevant. A mother might well say, for example, 
“I do not prohibit my ten-year-old from riding her bicycle on roadways.” To make such a 
pronouncement, however, does not mean that the mother does not ever prohibit her ten-year-old 
from riding on roadways—for example, she might restrain her child from weaving through traffic 
on Fifth Avenue or from pedaling down a dark desert highway (and, all the more so, “a dark 
desert highway” to the Hotel California!). See THE EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL 
CALIFORNIA (Asylum Records 1976). A reading of Mitchell that comports with this interpretive 
principle makes especially good sense in light of the context of that case. As noted below, the 
defendant’s argument in Mitchell stemmed from the idea that prosecutions under the challenged 
hate-crime law would broadly lead to the improper use of past-speech evidence. See infra notes 
114–18 and accompanying text. One (entirely proper) response of the Court was to challenge the 
premise of this argument by noting that under Haupt and Dawson, many uses of past-speech 
evidence are totally proper. But saying that many uses of such evidence are totally proper is a far 
cry from saying that all uses of such evidence are totally proper. See also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489 
(reiterating the Haupt Court’s insistence that such evidence “be scrutinized with care”). The 
broader point is that Mitchell simply did not present the question whether all First Amendment 
objections to relevant past-speech evidence should be barred. See infra notes 115–18 and 
accompanying text. And even if the Court somehow meant to declare—however oddly and 
obliquely—that all free-speech-based challenges to proffers of relevant past-speech evidence 
were henceforth verboten, the significance of such a proclamation deserved, and still deserves, 
more thoughtful treatment than a one-sentence dictum.  
 71. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses 
of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 
1283 n.2, 1315, 1340–41 (2005) (noting the distinctive character of cases that only involve free-
speech-evidence issues in discussing generally applicable laws). 
 72. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive 
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Is this unwaveringly accommodating approach to the use of 
relevant past-speech evidence justifiable? We have already seen that it 
is not justifiable as a matter of stare decisis; in particular, the Court’s 
rulings in Dawson and other past cases do not command this approach. 
But reaching that conclusion merely highlights the more basic question 
as to what governing rules should operate in this set of cases. Working 
through this matter brings into focus three more-particularized 
questions: First, precisely what is it about past-speech evidence that 
creates difficulties with its use under Free Speech Clause principles? 
Second, how do constitutional doctrines dealing with generally 
applicable laws—and the policies that underlie those doctrines—
intersect with disputes about the admissibility of past-speech evidence? 
And third, if the First Amendment requires judges to police the use of 
otherwise relevant past-speech proof, what governing limits does that 
Amendment impose? The remainder of this Article explores these 
questions. 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND PAST-SPEECH EVIDENCE 
Courts routinely receive into evidence out-of-court statements 
made by criminal defendants. These statements range from confessions 
obtained by law enforcement authorities to electronically intercepted 
conspiratorial communications to boasts made to friends about having 
committed a crime. Few analysts would suggest that the First 
Amendment requires exclusion of evidence of this kind. But given that 
fact, how should courts identify the types of past-speech evidence that 
might qualify for exclusion based on free-speech principles? Working 
through this conundrum requires courts to direct attention to an 
important body of post-Haupt law. 
In a long and strong line of modern decisions, the Court has 
declared that the Constitution affords “special protection” to speech 
that addresses “matters of public concern.”73 This protection comports 
with the First Amendment’s core objective of ensuring the “robust 
debate of public issues,”74 and all the more so because “speech 
 
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 461–62 (1996) (noting, with regard to 
breach-of-the-peace laws, that their application “not only to speech, but also to conduct posing a 
risk of disorder” carries with it a “breadth [that] usually decreases . . . the chance of illicit[, 
viewpoint-repressive governmental] purpose”).  
 73. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 458 (2011). 
 74. Id. at 452 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 
(1985)). 
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concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence 
of self-government.”75 Stated otherwise, protecting speech on matters 
of public concern directly advances the First Amendment’s most 
salient (or least controversial) overarching aims—namely, to foster a 
well-functioning participatory democracy and to facilitate the search 
for truth on matters of the highest importance to society as a whole.76 
There is a less apparent point, too. Protecting highly provocative 
speech on political and social matters—that is, the sort of speech that 
is the primary subject of investigation in this Article—links up in a 
special way with ensuring that citizens are afforded the chance to 
pursue individual self-realization through communicative activity.77 
This is the case because not many citizens are willing to bear the social, 
and perhaps legal, costs of “putting themselves out there” as speech-
wielding, counterculture iconoclasts.78 And if they are, the very 
radicalism that leads them to incur such costs seems likely to be tied 
tightly to a core sense of self.79 
Against this backdrop, the Court has chosen to give “broad 
protection” to speech on matters of public concern.80 It has done so in 
part by defining that term expansively to include all expression that can 
“be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community.”81 It does not matter that the 
“contribution to public discourse” of a particular item of such speech 
“may be negligible.”82 It is also of no consequence that such an 
 
 75. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)). 
 76. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 935–40 (19th ed. 
2016). 
 77. See id. at 938–39. 
 78. Ho Hwan Park, Youjia Zhou & Myungweon Choi, When Are Individuals Innovative?, 
17 J. PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1 (2018) (“Conscientious individuals tend to follow rules, conform to 
norms, be cautious and risk averse, and strictly adhere to standards; thus, they are less likely to 
come up with new ideas and change the status quo.”). 
 79. Suggestive of the pressures described here, and of the self-actualizing responses one 
might make to them, is an iconic, though cryptic, counterculture anthem of the early 1970s. See 
DAVID CROSBY, Almost Cut My Hair, on DÉJÀ VU (Atlantic Records 1970). In it, the singer—
himself a counterculture icon—describes the choice made when “I almost cut my hair.” Id. 
Ruminations that crop up in the song concern “paranoia” connected with the possibility of 
“lookin’ in my mirror and seeing a police car.” Id. But the hair, in the end, remains unscissored. 
Id. Despite the risks of having unconventionally long hair, the singer in the end concludes, “I’m 
not givin’ in an inch to fear” because “I feel like letting my freak flag fly.” Id.  
 80. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).  
 82. Id. at 460.  
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utterance is “inappropriate or controversial”83 or “arouses 
contempt.”84 To the contrary, “in public debate [we] must tolerate 
insulting, and even outrageous, speech.”85 These principles are so 
vibrant that the Court has drawn on them to deem such 
pronouncements as “God hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” 
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “Pope in Hell” as embodiments 
of speech on matters of public concern.86 
In addition to defining the notion of public-concern speech 
broadly, the Court has seized on this concept to safeguard expression 
in many different legal settings. These rulings stretch across 
defamation law87 to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress88 to statutes that limit media reports of purportedly 
confidential information89 to public-employee-expression cases.90 
Along the way, the Court has declared without reservation that speech 
on matters of public concern “occupies the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values.”91 
Courts accordingly must take account of public-concern-speech 
doctrine as they grapple with First Amendment limits on the use of 
expression-related evidence. Indeed, public-concern-speech doctrine 
bears on the formulation of those limits in two distinct ways. First, this 
body of law provides a previously endorsed, and thus ready-to-use, 
touchstone for separating speech-related evidence that is worthy of 
First Amendment scrutiny from speech-related evidence that is not—
such as speech in the form of confessions and crime-planning 
conversations. Second, the public-concern-speech doctrine now 
operates with much force in many cases, including many civil cases. 
 
 83. Id. at 453 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987)). 
 84. Id. at 458. 
 85. Id. (quoting Boss v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).  
 86. Id. at 454 (citation omitted). 
 87. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
 88. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 443. 
 89. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534–35 (2001); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (identifying a special need to protect public-school 
speech if it “can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue”).  
 90. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987). A particularly significant public-
employee-speech case is Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), which is discussed at some length 
infra notes 232–42. 
 91. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 145); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep’t 
of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008). All these decisions comport with a broader point, too—in 
many contexts, going back many years, the Court has emphasized that speech on political and 
social issues rests at “the core of the First Amendment.” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 
458 U.S. 886, 926–27 (1982) (describing “highly charged political rhetoric” this way). 
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And if public-concern speech merits this sort of “broad protection” in 
civil law, it becomes hard to see why it should receive no serious 
scrutiny when it is offered as evidence to secure criminal convictions 
that might lead to years of imprisonment or even death.92 
One possible response to this line of analysis posits that whether 
or not public-concern speech is in the picture, the government cannot 
be regarded as “abridging the freedom of speech”—as proscribed by 
the text of the First Amendment—unless it moves to sanction speech 
itself, such as by making speech with specific characteristics the actus 
reus of a crime. It is well settled, however, that the First Amendment 
sweeps more broadly than that.93 Indeed, Dawson removes any doubt 
on this score. As the Court there explained, “the reach of the First 
Amendment” often blocks the state from “criminalizing . . . conduct” 
that takes the form of speech.94 But the Amendment “goes further than 
that,”95 including, in proper cases, by preventing the State from 
employing speech as evidence.96 
Dawson thus confirms what many other cases suggest—namely, 
that prosecutorial deployments of past-speech evidence “burden,”97 
“impair,”98 or “affect adversely”99 protected expression in a manner 
that brings the First Amendment into play. To be sure, courts might 
nonetheless embrace a constitutional rule that allows all uses of past 
speech “just” or “simply” as evidence so long as that evidence 
surpasses the minimum threshold of relevance.100 Such a sweeping 
exemption from any constitutional protection, however, is hard to 
square with the idea that such uses of speech impose cognizable First 
Amendment burdens on defendant-declarants. And this conclusion 
becomes even more compelling when it is recognized that prosecutorial 
use of past-speech evidence encroaches on free-expression rights in no 
fewer than three separate ways: (1) by exposing defendants to 
 
 92. But cf. United States v. Herron, No. 10–CR–0615, 2014 WL 1871909, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 8, 2014) (dismissing the Court’s protection of public-concern speech in Snyder as 
inapplicable in the past-speech-evidence context). 
 93. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that 
forced disclosure of a membership list abridged members’ speech rights, even though those 
disclosures did not subject the members to governmentally imposed criminal or civil sanctions). 
 94. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168 (1992). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 929 (emphasizing this point). 
 97. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). 
 98. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960). 
 99. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
 100. Volokh, supra note 71, at 1315, 1340.  
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conviction based on the factfinder’s unfairly prejudicial consideration 
of such speech; (2) by subjecting defendants to convictions based on 
such speech even in the absence of unfair prejudice; and (3) by chilling 
provocative expression by defendants and by others as well. 
A. Convictions Based on Unfair Prejudice 
The Government’s use of past-speech evidence burdens that 
speech, first and foremost, because that evidence might well come to 
weigh on the minds of jurors for legally impermissible reasons. Trials 
are complex affairs. Jurors find themselves in an unfamiliar setting. 
Judges provide them with instructions before, during, and after the 
submission of evidence. Jurors must sift through large amounts of 
information. But when they learn that the defendant is a Nazi or a 
Klansman, that information is likely to stick in their minds. Such 
evidence—at least for most—is jarring, hurtful, and deeply 
disturbing.101 Thus, “[i]n a case such as this, a jury is unlikely to be 
neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech, posing a real danger 
of becoming an instrument for the suppression of . . . vehement, caustic, 
and sometimes unpleasan[t] expression.”102  
Whenever a trial judge admits past-speech evidence, it is—like all 
evidence—admissible only for specific purposes. As the Introduction 
to this Article shows, for example, such evidence might help to show 
that the defendant committed a criminal act by suggesting the existence 
of an underlying motive for engaging in that behavior. Jurors, however, 
might view motive-related evidence as showing something more—a 
lack of honor, reason, or restraint; future unpredictability; or 
outlandish foolishness.103 Those charged with factfinding might 
conclude, in other words, that the defendant is bad, radical, or weird 
and deserving of punishment for that reason.104 The mysteries of 
 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that proof 
of one defendant’s connection to the Hell’s Angels motorcycle organization brought such a risk 
of prejudice in a methamphetamine-manufacturing prosecution that the conviction must be 
reversed in case the jury had deemed the defendant “guilty by association,” notwithstanding a 
limiting instruction).  
 102. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
 103. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404. See also Quint, supra note 2, at 1658 n.81 (noting the 
“particular dangers” of juries’ assessments of this kind because of their built-in “majoritarian” 
cast and lack of sensitivity to systemic free-speech values). 
 104. See, e.g., Stuart P. Fischoff, Gangsta’ Rap and a Murder in Bakersfield, 29 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 795, 797 (1999) (noting expert testimony that juries use rap lyrics to reach guilty 
verdicts improperly because of “negative personality trait associations conjured up by such 
inflammatory lyrics”). 
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psychological analysis make it difficult to say that all jurors in all 
circumstances ignore such appraisals of character in the decision-
making process, even when they are instructed to do just that.105 
Indeed, this is a major reason why the use of character evidence has 
long been subjected to far-reaching limitations under general evidence 
law principles.106 Nor can community-representing juries be counted on 
to avoid improper condemnation of political and social dissidents. The 
radical nature of the speech of such persons, after all, almost certainly 
will brand them as outliers within the very communities from which 
jurors are drawn. To be sure, some community members may share or 
sympathize with the worldviews of steely-edged naysayers. The more 
likely it is that prospective jurors do so, however, the more likely it is 
that they will be excluded from jury service from the outset through 
the use of peremptory strikes. 
Most important of all, to the extent that speech-driven, character-
related considerations improperly come into play in the course of the 
jury’s work, the burden placed on protected speech is both obvious and 
profound. The difficulty, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once 
declared, is that “defendants are to be made to suffer not for what the 
indictment alleges but for the creed that they avow.”107 Professor Quint 
captures this concern in these words: 
Whenever evidence of unpopular but protected speech or association 
is introduced against a criminal defendant, the jury may make 
improper use of that evidence by penalizing the exercise of First 
Amendment rights. In a criminal trial, the jury as a constituent of the 
court exercises the power of the state. Hence, the improper 
penalization of protected speech by a jury violates the First 
 
 105. See Quint, supra note 2, at 1648 n.81, 1666 (developing the point that 
“limiting . . . instructions are ineffective as a prophylactic technique,” and quoting Justice 
Jackson’s observation that “[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by 
instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction” (quoting 
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring))). See generally 
Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 37 (1985) (discussing how juries use criminal-record evidence against defendants, even 
when such evidence is designed only to impeach a witness’s credibility). 
 106. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note (highlighting that rules on 
character evidence are “deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence” and that such evidence faces 
limitations because it has “slight probative value and may be very prejudicial”; and further, 
emphasizing that character evidence “tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of 
what actually happened . . . [and] subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to 
punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what . . . actually happened”). 
 107. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment to the same extent as analogous action by any other 
governmental entity.108 
The essential idea is that the use at trial of past-speech evidence 
often creates a perilously high danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant—unfair in the sense that the factfinder may well consider 
the evidence for reasons that go beyond its proper use as evidence, thus 
disadvantaging the defendant because of protected beliefs, 
associations, or statements. In other words, the introduction of past-
speech evidence places a burden on speech by threatening to generate 
an improperly obtained conviction. Indeed, the inherent tendency of 
past-speech evidence to prejudice the defendant means that all cases 
involving its use present the very same danger highlighted in Dawson—
namely, that decisions adverse to criminal defendants will be driven by 
reasons that should have “no bearing on the issue being tried.”109 
B. Convictions Based on “Fair Prejudice” 
As the foregoing analysis suggests, Professor Quint focuses on the 
danger of “unfair prejudice” in arguing for careful judicial review of 
prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence. So, too, do other analysts.110 
The risk of unfair prejudice arises because of the possibility that the 
factfinder may rely on part of the prosecutor’s evidentiary submission 
in a way that is inconsistent with the rules of evidence. But 
prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence presents an additional 
problem: Even when that evidence is not unfairly put to work, it still 
operates to establish the defendant’s guilt, particularly when the 
defendant otherwise might have been found not guilty. As a result, the 
government’s actions cause the defendant’s past engagement in wholly 
protected speech to operate to the extreme detriment of the defendant. 
Thus, earlier critics of wide-open use of past-speech evidence have 
missed, or at least underemphasized, a significant point: the use of past-
 
 108. Quint, supra note 2, at 1641. 
 109. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168 (1992). To be sure, some analysts may argue that 
prosecutorial use of “unfairly prejudicial” evidence with some, though perhaps only minimal, 
relevance is more justifiable than the use of “unfairly prejudicial” evidence that, as the majority 
seemed to see things in Dawson, fails to cross the relevance line. But regardless of this point, the 
burden placed on the defendant’s speech in both cases is the same—that is, the disadvantage that 
arises because the jury may rely on that speech for unfairly prejudicial, and thus impermissible, 
purposes. 
 110. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 324–26 (2005); Faulkner, supra note 5, at 20 (“[B]y far the greatest danger 
is that the truth-seeking function . . . will be compromised . . . .”). 
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speech evidence burdens expression rights even if a jury considers it in 
wholly Simon-pure fashion—that is, in a way that is entirely proper for 
the purposes of evidence law standing alone. 
To review the basics, only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. 
Thus, the admission of past-speech evidence necessarily means that the 
judge has found it to be probative as to some factual issue in the case. 
As a result, to the extent that a factfinder considers the evidence only 
in resolving that issue, the factfinder will not have used the evidence in 
a way that is unfairly prejudicial. Even in these circumstances, 
however, past speech is being used against the defendant, and for this 
reason prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence is problematic “in and 
of itself.”111 In other words, one burden on expression that arises from 
the use of past-speech evidence involves what might be called “fair 
prejudice,” and this burden is borne by defendants in two separate 
ways. First, the fair-prejudice burden arises because prosecutorial and 
judicial actions put the past-speech evidence before the jury for the 
very purpose of inviting the jury to view that evidence as tending to 
show the defendant’s guilt. In other words, the Government’s use of 
the evidence is bad for the defendant, and that bad result arises only 
because the defendant engaged in protected speech in the past. 
Second, in some cases, the use of past-speech evidence—even in 
the absence of unfair prejudice—burdens the defendant in the most 
profound of ways because it proves decisive to the jury’s finding of 
guilt. In these cases, use of the evidence stands in the starkest tension 
with the core First Amendment principle that, when the government 
considers taking action against an individual, that individual “should 
not have the . . . question resolved against him because of 
constitutionally protected conduct.”112 The difficulty is apparent. If 
past-speech evidence is the straw that breaks the camel’s back in 
generating a successful prosecution, the government will have secured 
the defendant’s punishment because of the defendant’s past protected 
speech in a direct and obvious sense.113 By definition, after all, but-for 
causation is present when one thing—here, the submission of past-
speech evidence—is decisive in bringing about a particular outcome—
here, the conviction of the defendant. 
 
 111. Dennis, supra note 4, at 40. 
 112. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977).  
 113. Put another way, in such a case, the conviction not only “may have rested on a form of 
expression, however distasteful, which the Constitution tolerates and protects.” Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969). Instead, in such a case, the conviction does rest on such expression 
in a decisive, but-for sense. 
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To be sure, for almost all lawyers and judges, it would be too 
extreme to say that this but-for-causation problem requires in all cases 
the exclusion of relevant past-speech evidence. But that does not 
change the fact that this but-for-causation problem exists. To be sure, 
many judges may deem the burden that arises from the fair-prejudice 
effects of using past-speech evidence—including its potential but-for-
causation effects—to be less worrisome than the burden that arises 
from the risk of unfair prejudice. Even if that view of things is sound, 
however, the fair-prejudice problem is real. And as a result, the fair-
prejudice burden on speech should count for something—and perhaps 
count significantly—when courts work to accommodate individual 
rights and societal needs as the two come into conflict in this set of 
cases. 
C. Chilling Effects 
A third burden imposed by prosecutors’ leveraging of past-speech 
evidence involves chilling effects. In particular, using public-concern 
speech as inculpatory evidence threatens to stifle such speech not only 
by criminal defendants themselves, but also by social outsiders of all 
stripes. Notably, the chilling-effects problem posed by authorizing the 
use of speech as evidence is very different from the problem posed by 
the direct prohibition of communicative activity. This is so because a 
person who makes statements that are themselves entirely legal may 
be slow to consider the prospect that those statements could be used as 
inculpatory evidence in a later proceeding that does not involve 
prosecution for the statements themselves. The Court made this very 
point in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, deeming it “speculative” to assume that 
a would-be speaker might think through things in this way.114 The 
following examination of Mitchell, however, reveals that the problem 
analyzed by the Court in that case was so specialized and distinct that 
it should not bear on formulating constitutional rules concerning the 
admissibility of past-speech evidence. 
In particular, the Court in Mitchell confronted a facial challenge 
to a statute that required sentence enhancements for crimes motivated 
by bias regarding the victim’s “race, religion, color, disability, sexual 
orientation, national origin or ancestry.”115 The case did not present 
any issue regarding the propriety of introducing speech-based evidence 
at trial to prove a prohibited discriminatory intent or to prove anything 
 
 114. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993). 
 115. Id. at 480.  
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else. Instead, the defendant in Mitchell argued that chilling-effects 
concerns, coupled with the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, 
required invalidation of the challenged sentencing-enhancement law as 
a whole because some prosecutors might sometimes invoke the law to 
support the introduction of past-speech evidence about a defendant’s 
biased views.116 Put another way, Mitchell involved an attack on each 
and every application of a substantive criminal restriction—indeed, a 
very common form of substantive restriction—based on an effort, 
novel in the extreme, to extend the overbreadth doctrine.117 One might 
even go so far as to conclude that the Court in Mitchell did nothing 
more than reach the most predictable of results— namely, by 
determining that the potential use of past-speech evidence in some 
cases does not warrant the wholesale invalidation of all forms of state 
and federal antidiscrimination laws.118 In any event, the Court never 
suggested that actual prosecutorial use in an actual case of politically 
or socially charged past-speech evidence creates no risk whatsoever of 
generating problematic chilling effects. 
Nor should it have. As noted earlier, the Court in Mitchell 
observed that outright prohibitions on speech generate greater 
chilling-effect problems than trial-process rules under which utterances 
made today might be used as evidence sometime in the future.119 But 
that does not mean that the evidentiary use of protected speech creates 
no chilling effects at all.120 At least some potential speakers 
contemplate the risk of future evidentiary use of their statements, 
especially if they are repeat players in the criminal justice system or 
already enmeshed in litigation. Others may hesitate to engage in 
boundary-pushing commentary because of a generalized, but still 
accurate, wariness that legal disadvantages lie in wait for agitators who 
 
 116. Id. at 488.  
 117. The argument was novel in the extreme because the overbreadth doctrine authorizes the 
facial invalidation of a statute when “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional” 
in comparison to its “legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010). In 
Mitchell, however, the challenger did not argue that the hate-crime law was overbroad in this 
traditional sense. Instead, he argued that the statute was rightly viewed as overbroad because it 
might have the practical effect of causing the introduction into evidence of protected-speech 
activity, even if the statute itself outlawed only properly proscribable behavior. See supra note 
116 and accompanying text. 
 118. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (reasoning that hate-crime laws are not functionally 
distinguishable from other antidiscrimination statutes). 
 119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Nickerson, supra note 6, at 871 (noting, in this regard, that “the absence of empirical 
evidence of a chilling effect” has not negated the Court’s recognition of such effects); Quint, supra 
note 2, at 1645–46 (developing the same point).  
COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2018  11:02 AM 
2019] FREE SPEECH AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 665 
do not hold their tongues. And that generalized wariness might well 
emanate in part from prosecutorial use of past speech as evidence. 
Chilling effects may be particularly acute for specialized 
communities of speakers. In recent years, for example, the use of rap 
lyrics as evidence has generated widespread media coverage.121 Thus, 
the risk arises that some rap artists will water down the edginess of their 
lyrics because they know those lyrics might later be used as evidence 
against them. Indeed, other legal analysts (who know much more about 
rap music than I do) have concluded that this risk is very real.122 
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that thoughtful 
commentators—including First Amendment luminary Thomas I. 
Emerson—have concluded that the evidentiary use of past speech 
causes problematic chilling effects.123 Moreover, the danger presented 
 
 121. See, e.g., Adam Dunbar, Rap on Trial: Do Violent Lyrics Prove a Crime, CRIME REP. 
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/08/07/rap-on-trial-do-violent-lyrics-prove-a-crime 
[https://perma.cc/M2RT-E4NF]; Lorne Manly, Legal Debate on Using Boastful Rap Lyrics as a 
Smoking Gun, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/arts/music/
using-rap-lyrics-as-damning-evidence-stirs-legal-debate.html [https://perma.cc/DZ9X-SF4X]; 
Erik Nielson, ‘Rap on Trial’: Why Lyrics Should Be Off-Limits, ROLLING STONE (May 3, 2017, 
8:05 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/rap-on-trial-why-lyrics-should-be-
off-limits-116368 [https://perma.cc/ELB5-R8L3]; Alyssa Rosenberg, How Cops and Prosecutors 
are Putting Rap Music on Trial, WASH. POST (May 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/act-four/wp/2014/05/21/how-cops-and-prosecutors-are-putting-rap-music-on-trial/?utm
_term=.cf831aa761b1 [https://perma.cc/7TMJ-9H9S]; Kay Wicker, Amateur Rap Lyrics Are Being 
Used as Evidence Across the Country, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 1, 2017, 10:30 AM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/rap-lyrics-evidence-texas-acb3870f7d2c [https://perma.cc/QS7R-JRSV]. 
 122. See Dennis, supra note 4, at 5, 40 (noting the “negative impact [that use of rap music as 
evidence] will have on the production and quality of art”); Jason E. Powell, Note, R.A.P.: Rule 
Against Perps (Who Write Rhymes), 41 RUTGERS L.J. 479, 499 (2009) (citing views of practicing 
lawyers that “using rap lyrics as evidence will . . . lead to mundane, unprovocative art”); id. at 
515–16 (“When courts use creative devices as evidence of their creator’s knowledge or intent to 
commit a crime, the result is a chilling effect . . . [including] a chilling effect on the rap music 
genre.”).  
 123. Emerson describes the problem of chilling effects as follows: 
[E]xpression may be seriously inhibited when the speaker knows that what he says can 
be used against him at a later time if some unforeseen action ensues, can be taken into 
account by a jury in determining his state of mind in performing a subsequent act, or 
can perhaps be the decisive factor in a jury’s general verdict against him. 
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 405 (1970). See also Anderson, 
supra note 5, at 902 (urging that “the potential for a chilling effect on listeners’ rights under the 
First Amendment” based on the compelled provision of evidence “is very real”); Faulkner, supra 
note 5, at 12; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 879, 890 (1988) (citing the prospect of individuals’ fears that “constitutionally 
protected statements would come back later to haunt them”); Nickerson, supra note 6, at 847; 
Quint, supra note 2, at 1645–46 (noting chilling-effect concerns); Note, Conspiracy and the First 
Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872, 894 (1970) (same); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth 
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by these effects has risen significantly in recent decades with the 
explosion of modern communications technologies. One effect of those 
technologies is particularly significant: acts of expression today 
routinely take place on the Internet and are thus locked into a 
retrievable form. In similar fashion, even brief rants can be captured 
on cellphones and similar easy-to-use devices. The making of speech in 
such permanently recorded ways thus allows present-day prosecutors 
to discover and deploy past-speech evidence much more readily than 
prosecutors of the past.124 And this reality compounds the risk that 
would-be speakers will be deterred from engaging in full-throated 
dissent precisely because they know their words might well become 
available for use by the government, including as evidence, at a later 
time. 
None of this means that under present conditions most Internet 
speakers steer clear of sharing extremist views in forms they otherwise 
would freely use. That is neither the case nor the point. The point 
instead is that there is reason to conclude that some speakers hold back 
in some circumstances to some degree, in part because what they say 
might later be used as evidence against them. This effect, in turn, 
strikes at the heart of the First Amendment because it involves the 
suppression of protected speech. Notably, the Court has never required 
a detailed empirical showing of the fact or the extent of these sorts of 
chilling effects. Instead, it has simply used its own common sense in 
concluding that certain forms of government action might well deter 
wide-open engagement in protected expression.125 That same approach 
suggests that, in this context, chilling-effect concerns have a role to play 
as courts decide how to handle past-speech evidence. 
 
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 926 n.325 (1970) (same). For some judicial treatments, see 
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 169 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting “the potential 
chilling effect that consideration of First Amendment activity at sentencing might have”) and 
United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that “‘chilling’ concerns” resulting 
from evidentiary use “are especially powerful where political speech is involved”). But see 
Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001) (downplaying any “potential chilling 
effect”). 
 124. See Dennis, supra note 4, at 40–41 (emphasizing the “exceedingly public” nature of the 
Internet and that “[l]aw enforcement and prosecutors will train their sights on . . . widely 
accessible types of creative expression”). 
 125. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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III.  FREE SPEECH, EVIDENCE, AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS 
As the foregoing discussion shows, prosecutorial use of past-
speech evidence places a burden—indeed, a complex, multipart 
burden—on protected expression. Even so, perhaps this burden should 
not give rise to any meaningful constitutional restraint. Part I of this 
Article shows, for example, that lower courts have read Dawson to 
foreclose the imposition of First Amendment limits on the use of 
relevant past-speech evidence.126 But Part I also demonstrates that this 
reading of Dawson is misguided.127 Is there another line of argument 
that thoughtful prosecutors might put forward as they urge courts to 
allow the use of all relevant past-speech evidence? One can imagine an 
argument that builds on the idea that generally applicable evidence law 
is not subject to Free Speech Clause challenges precisely because it is 
generally applicable in character. After all, generally applicable laws 
are, in their nature, far removed from laws that target speech itself. Of 
particular importance, the widespread operation of such laws, 
including against nonspeakers, provides assurance that the government 
put them in place for salutary reasons wholly unrelated to the 
burdening of constitutionally protected rights. 
The poster child for this line of reasoning is Employment Division 
v. Smith.128 There, the Court relied on the generally applicable 
character of the law at issue to reject an as-applied Free Exercise 
Clause challenge to a ban on the use of peyote, which the individual 
who raised the challenge had ingested as a sacramental act.129 And 
Smith does not stand alone. The Court has relied on the generally 
applicable character of challenged laws to resist their invalidation in a 
number of cases that did not involve the Free Exercise Clause.130 None 
of this would matter if the Court had made clear that its hands-off 
treatment of generally applicable laws in other contexts had no role 
whatsoever to play in free-speech cases. But in one earlier case, Cohen 
v. Cowles Media Co.,131 the Court suggested—albeit both 
controversially and confusingly—that the generally applicable 
 
 126. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text. 
 128. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 194 (1983) (applying the Contracts Clause); 
see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–48 (1976) (refusing to apply heightened Equal 
Protection Clause scrutiny solely because of a law’s minority-disadvantaging effects).  
 131. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
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character of a challenged law might, at least sometimes, exempt it from 
constitutional free-expression-based challenge.132 
These authorities provide ammunition for those who believe that 
prosecutorial use of relevant past-speech proof should be allowed—
with no constitutional limits—because evidence law is generally 
applicable in character. Evidence law, after all, does not target speech. 
Instead, it deals with all forms of evidence. In addition, the purposes of 
evidence rules have nothing to do with “the suppression of free 
expression”;133 rather, those rules focus on ensuring the fair, orderly, 
and well-informed resolution of factual disputes.134 
Further, the law of evidence is generally applicable in a special 
way. The typical generally applicable law, such as the peyote ban at 
issue in Smith, has a one-way-street quality in that it imposes burdens 
that do not extend to the government. Put differently, such a law 
exposes only ordinary citizens to the limits and sanctions the 
government has imposed. The law of evidence, in contrast, 
simultaneously benefits and burdens both ordinary citizens and the 
government itself—for instance, by subjecting all parties in any trial to 
the rule that all relevant evidence is presumptively admissible against 
them. This dynamic might cause courts to hesitate to place First 
Amendment limits on the operation of evidence rules in a way that 
disadvantages only the State. Those judges might reason that given the 
two-way-street nature of the law of evidence, it is inappropriate to 
install a one-way-street constitutional restriction that limits the 
prerogatives only of government prosecutors.135 At the very least, some 
 
 132. Id. at 672. A later discussion of the Cohen case shows why this reading of it, even if 
superficially plausible, is unjustifiable. See infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 133. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 134. In addition, some policy reasons that support the Court’s ruling in Smith seem applicable 
in the past-speech-evidence context. Just as in Smith, applying a bright-line rule, based on the 
doctrine of generally applicable laws, would ease the decision-making task in this context. A 
bright-line rule would also make it less likely that judges would smuggle personal considerations 
into the decision-making process. Indeed, one might say that the Smith principle should control, 
a fortiori, questions concerning the admissibility of past-speech evidence. On this view, Mr. 
Smith’s spiritually inspired peyote use was itself the gravamen of the charged criminal offense. In 
free-expression-evidence cases, on the other hand, speech comes before the factfinder as just “one 
link in the long chain of evidence.” See Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001).  
 135. For a similar line of analysis advanced by Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Richard A. 
Nagareda regarding the Compulsory Process Clause, see infra note 141. Notably, however, the 
Amar-Nagareda position has been rejected by the Supreme Court. See id. Also cutting against 
this line of analysis is the practical reality that some evidence rules—such as the coconspirator-
declaration exception to the hearsay rule—apply overwhelmingly to the disadvantage of criminal 
defendants, and other evidence rules discriminate on their face against defendants and in favor of 
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judges might say, the only properly recognized constitutional limit in 
this field should focus—à la Dawson—on evidentiary relevance, 
because such a limit reinforces, rather than undermines, the long-
recognized generally applicable principle that all relevant proof is 
presumptively admissible at trial.136 
This line of argument may have surface appeal. But it suffers from 
a fatal flaw. The problem is that the two-way-street argument fails to 
take account of the full body of the Court’s jurisprudence on generally 
applicable law. and the policy concerns that have driven the Court’s 
key precedents on general applicability. Indeed, four separate 
components of the Court’s doctrine undermine the position that past-
speech evidence should be admissible, despite First Amendment 
protections, because of the generally applicable nature of evidence law: 
(1) the Court’s past declaration that laws challenged on free-speech 
grounds—in contrast to laws challenged on free-exercise grounds, as in 
Smith—are not immune from constitutional attack because of their 
generally applicable character;137 (2) the Court’s particular insistence 
that judicial review should be more exacting when generally applicable 
laws place “direct-in-effect” burdens—as opposed to merely 
“incidental” burdens—on protected speech;138 (3) the Court’s 
insistence, even in the Smith case, that otherwise operative limits on 
judicial review do not apply when the challenged law, even though 
generally applicable, requires “individualized” governmental 
determinations about “eligibility” issues;139 and (4) the Court’s 
longstanding endorsement of speech-protective “First Amendment 
 
the Government. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1967) (detailing 
special limits on the use of admissions of government agents in criminal proceedings). 
 136. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 137. See infra Part III.A. Putting to one side the Court’s ruling in the Cohen case, see infra 
notes 147–53 and accompanying text, there is one arguable exception to the proposition that laws 
burdening free speech are not immune from constitutional challenge merely because of their 
general applicability. The relevant limitation was recognized in a line of cases culminating in 
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986). There, the Court dealt with the application to a 
bookstore of a municipal ordinance that mandated a year-long closure of any business site on 
which “sexual activity” had occurred. Id. at 699. The Court held that this law was not subject to 
any form of First Amendment review. Id. at 707. The Court’s reasoning was that the target of the 
government’s action was the lewd conduct—here, largely prostitution—which had “nothing to do 
with books or other expressive activity.” Id. In contrast, the burden that is placed on the 
defendant-declarant in past-speech-evidence cases stems directly from that individual’s past 
engagement in protected speech itself. Accordingly, Arcara is beside the point here. 
 138. See infra Part III.B. 
 139. See infra Part III.C. 
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due process” restrictions, including in cases that involve the 
Government’s use of evidence.140 
It merits emphasis that none of these four means of avoiding 
Smith’s general-applicability reasoning is farfetched in this context; 
indeed, each one has its origins in settled precedent and has much to 
be said in its favor. Even more important, the underlying reasons that 
have given rise to each of the lines of precedent support the case for 
meaningful First Amendment scrutiny of past-speech evidence. In sum, 
four already-established bodies of general-applicability doctrine, 
especially when viewed as a whole, offer powerful justifications for 
imposing significant constitutional limits on the evidentiary use of past 
protected expression.141 
 
 140. See infra Part III.D. 
 141. There is a fifth line of cases—distinguishable from the four discussed in the text because 
it has no direct connection to the First Amendment—that supports this same pro-defendant view. 
In these cases, the Supreme Court has held that judges sometimes must override generally 
applicable evidence rules related to privilege, hearsay, and the like, so as to admit otherwise 
inadmissible evidence and thereby vindicate the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. 2 
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY 
PRIVILEGES § 11.2.1 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 3d ed. 2017). Illustrative is the extent to which 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compel attendance of “witnesses in his favor” trumps 
generally applicable evidence law limits that render certain forms of testimony inadmissible. 
Some distinguished commentators argue that courts should rebuff Sixth Amendment claims along 
these lines so long as the nonconstitutional evidence law rule in question applies in generally 
applicable fashion to limit equally the testimony-presenting prerogatives of both criminal 
defendants and prosecutors. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 641, 699 (1996) (“If the government cannot compel a doctor to testify against his patient, 
because of a general doctor-patient privilege, a defendant cannot so compel this doctor.”); 
Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1069 
(1999) (arguing “that a wide array of sources . . . form a compelling case to reconceive the right 
[to compel witness attendance] as one of equal treatment”). The Court, however, has rejected this 
approach, holding instead that generally applicable evidence rules, including rules on privilege 
and hearsay, must sometimes give way to ensure the vindication of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights. See IMWINKELRIED, supra, § 11.2.1; accord id. § 11.2.2. (noting that under the Court’s 
rulings, “criminal defense counsel now have a constitutional argument for overriding exclusionary 
rules in the form of statutes, common law decisions, or court rules” in light of “the 
constitutionalization of the accused’s right to present defense evidence” (citation omitted)).  
Moreover, the Court’s approach makes sense. After all, as a noted treatise writer explains, 
“many of the constitutional provisions impacting evidence are found in the Bill of Rights; and 
rather than implementing an equality model, the essential thrust of the Bill of Rights is to impose 
special restrictions on the government.” Id. § 11.4.1; see id. § 11.3.2 (adding that it is “clear that 
the courts ought to employ as-applied analysis in adjudicating the constitutionality of evidentiary 
rules attacked under the accused’s constitutional right to present evidence”). The bottom line is 
that under governing Supreme Court doctrine, the Sixth Amendment sometimes requires 
departure from “purportedly absolute” common law or statutory rules of evidence law. Id. § 11.3–
11.3.1. And if such departures are required by the Sixth Amendment, one is left to ask why they 
should not likewise be required by the First. 
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A. O’Brien and Generally Applicable Rules of Evidence 
As discussed above, some judges might seek to immunize evidence 
law from as-applied First Amendment attacks because of its generally 
applicable character. There is, however, a front-and-center problem 
with this line of analysis. In contrast to its approach to free-exercise 
cases, the Court long has refused to apply a rule of automatic validation 
to generally applicable laws in the Free Speech Clause context. 
This story begins with United States v. O’Brien. There, the Court 
upheld the conviction of a draft-card-burning war protester under a law 
that, in generally applicable fashion, prohibited the mutilation of 
documents issued by the Selective Service System.142 Taking an 
approach fundamentally different from that in Smith, the Justices did 
not reject the defendant’s constitutional challenge simply because the 
mutilation ban was generally applicable in character. Instead, the 
Court undertook a case-specific balancing analysis, inquiring whether 
the government interests offered in support of the statute qualified as 
“substantial” and whether there existed an adequate “less restrictive” 
alternative for advancing those interests.143 In short, the Court directed 
what it later described as an “intermediate level of scrutiny” at the 
speech-specific application of the statute to the defendant.144 Notably, 
O’Brien does not stand alone in applying this form of heightened 
scrutiny to generally applicable laws. In later cases—including 
controversial post-Smith cases involving the claimed free-speech rights 
of nude dancers—the Court has continued to apply this intermediate-
scrutiny style of review to Free Speech Clause challenges directed at 
generally applicable laws.145 
 
 142. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370 (1968). 
 143. Id. at 380–82.  
 144. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994). 
 145. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), for example, the Court encountered 
a challenge to a generally applicable ban on nudity in public places, as applied to erotic dancers 
who performed at nightclubs. Id. at 563. All nine Justices accepted the premise that nude dancing 
is protected speech. See id. at 565–66 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 580–81 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 587–88 
(White, J., dissenting). Having joined the Court in doing so, however, Justice Scalia went on to 
urge the Court to abandon the O’Brien approach in light of Smith, thus rendering the nudity ban 
automatically immune from First Amendment challenge because of the law’s general 
applicability. Id. at 579–80 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Jed Rubenfeld, The 
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (advocating the same approach). Every 
other member of the Court, however, employed the O’Brien methodology. See Dan T. Coenen, 
Free Speech and Generally Applicable Laws: A New Doctrinal Synthesis, 103 IOWA L. REV. 435, 
473–74 (2018).  
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There is, however, more to the story because of the Court’s 
opinion in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.146 There, Justice 
Kennedy asserted that, under present-day doctrine, “a generally 
applicable law may or may not be subject to heightened scrutiny under 
the First Amendment.”147 In support of this seeming retreat from 
O’Brien, however, Justice Kennedy cited only one case, Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co.148 In that case, the Court rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to a promissory-estoppel-based damages 
judgment entered against a reporter who had breached an agreement 
to keep secret a source’s identity.149 Moreover, in doing so, the Court 
emphasized that the state promissory-estoppel law was “generally 
applicable” in nature.150 As Professor Eugene Volokh properly 
explains, however, the Court focused on the generally applicable 
character of promissory-estoppel law in rebuffing a Free Press Clause 
argument—rather than a Free Speech Clause argument—advanced by 
the defendant-reporter.151 In other words, the Court ruled that the 
general applicability of the promissory-estoppel cause of action meant 
that the reporter, regardless of his role as a member of the press, was 
entitled to no greater First Amendment protection from liability for 
promise-breaking than any other promise-breaking speaker. As for 
any separate Free Speech Clause challenge, Volokh further (and again 
soundly) explains that the Court’s ruling was extremely narrow.152 At 
most, it held that the reporter, precisely because he promised not to 
communicate the source’s identity, had voluntarily waived any Free 
Speech Clause right he otherwise might have been able to invoke to 
escape the state’s restriction on speech.153 
The foregoing analysis signals that O’Brien’s intermediate-
scrutiny approach remains fully operational in cases that involve free-
speech challenges to the generally applicable law of evidence 
because—to say the least—involuntarily becoming a criminal 
 
 146. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) 
 147. Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
 148. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (cited in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 
U.S. at 640). 
 149. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665–66, 672. 
 150. Id. at 670.  
 151. Volokh, supra note 71, at 1294–96. 
 152. Id. at 1297. 
 153. Id. For a far more detailed analysis, see Coenen, Free Speech and Generally Applicable 
Laws, supra note 145, at 468–73. As is concluded in that work, “a waiver theory best explains the 
Court’s treatment of the free-speech issue in Cohen.” Id. at 472. 
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defendant does not bespeak a voluntary waiver of one’s Free Speech 
Clause rights. Thus, there is good reason to conclude that the O’Brien 
test, or at least some form of O’Brien-style scrutiny, should apply in 
past-speech-evidence cases. To be sure, judicial use of an O’Brien-type 
test in this context does not ensure that courts applying the test will 
conclude that it requires the exclusion of relevant past-speech 
evidence. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the O’Brien 
standard has proven so toothless in actual operation that it affords no 
meaningful protection to speakers in any context at all.154 This 
depiction, however, overstates the limitations of O’Brien-style review. 
The key point is that the O’Brien standard requires courts to apply a 
level of scrutiny described by the Court as “intermediate,” and the 
Court has invoked intermediate scrutiny in many cases to limit the 
operation of speech-burdening laws.155 
So, why has the Court refused to overrule its Free Speech Clause 
ruling in O’Brien in the wake of its subsequent Free Exercise Clause 
ruling in Smith? The basic reason is that judicial protection of an 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” freedom of expression lies at the 
heart of our democratic system.156 And the sort of expression involved 
in past-speech-evidence cases puts that concern at its zenith precisely 
because those cases involve the burdening of speech on matters of 
public concern.157 For this reason, past-speech-evidence cases raise 
very different considerations than, say, the nude-dancing cases in which 
the Court found no violation of the O’Brien test. 
No less important, past-speech-evidence cases present a more 
compelling claim for judicial intervention than even O’Brien itself in 
one significant respect. As others have noted, the speaker in O’Brien 
had many ways to communicate his message without burning his draft 
card—including by decrying the Vietnam War in front of the very same 
sympathetic crowd, while burning an exact replica of his draft card.158 
In contrast, when drug-use-celebrating “trap rap” artists find 
 
 154. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech 
and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 945 (1993). 
 155. See Coenen, supra note 145, at 474. 
 156. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Coenen, Free Speech 
and Generally Applicable Laws, supra note 145, at 466–67 (developing this idea). 
 157. See supra notes 73–91 and accompanying text. Another distinction arises out of the 
special concern—prominently reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the religion 
clauses—about ensuring that government institutions take a neutral view of religious institutions 
and practices. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); see also Coenen, Free Speech 
and Generally Applicable Laws, supra note 145, at 466 (developing this distinction). 
 158. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 983 (2d ed. 1988). 
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themselves pressured to water down song lyrics, something more 
problematic is occurring. This is the case because any such watering 
down involves altering the words of their songs and thus the content of 
their intended messages. Indeed, such an alteration might even cause 
the substituted lyrics no longer qualify as trap rap at all. 
In sum, notwithstanding the Court’s hands-off free-exercise ruling 
in Smith, the hands-on, free-speech-protective ruling in O’Brien 
remains good law, and it is applicable in the context of past-speech 
evidence in a particularly powerful way. As is discussed below, a form 
of judicial scrutiny even stricter than the one recognized in O’Brien 
might well properly apply to prosecutorial use of criminal defendants’ 
past-speech evidence. At a minimum, however, O’Brien signals that 
the operation of evidence rules should have to survive a meaningful 
form of judicial review, notwithstanding their generally applicable 
character, when the Government seeks to use those rules to introduce 
past-speech proof against criminal defendants. 
B. Past-Speech Evidence and Direct-in-Effect Burdens on Expression 
Another line of Free Speech Clause authority confirms that judges 
should thoughtfully police prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence, 
whether or not it is relevant. This doctrine teaches that a generally 
applicable law requires especially “demanding” scrutiny159 when its 
application imposes not just an O’Brien-type “incidental” burden on 
speech, but a burden that qualifies as direct in effect.160 
This point is illustrated by Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,161 
which involved an as-applied Free Speech Clause challenge to a federal 
statute that prohibited the provision of “material support” to any 
government-listed terrorist group.162 Following this statute’s 
enactment, a nonprofit organization sued to block the law’s operation 
to the extent that it precluded the organization from training a terrorist 
group’s members about peaceably pursuing the group’s underlying 
aims.163 According to the organization, this application of the law 
violated the First Amendment because the training the organization 
sought to engage in plainly involved protected speech.164 The 
 
 159. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 160. The phrase “direct in effect” is my own. 
 161. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 162. Id. at 7–8. 
 163. Id. at 10–11. 
 164. Id. at 10, 14. 
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Government’s counterargument centered on the claim that the statute 
was subject to, and satisfied, the O’Brien test.165 In its view, the 
material-support law qualified as generally applicable because most of 
its applications—for example, to defendants charged with transferring 
weapons or cash to terrorists—did not involve training or other forms 
of expression.166 Thus, according to the Government, the applicable 
legal standard was O’Brien’s speech-control-friendly intermediate-
scrutiny test. 
The Court, however, concluded that Humanitarian Law Project 
differed from O’Brien in a key respect.167 As the Court observed, the 
speech of the draft-card burner in O’Brien had nothing to do with 
establishing the elements of the charged crime.168 Put another way, 
conduct in the form of draft-card mutilation was criminalized, for one 
and for all, entirely apart from anyone’s engagement in that conduct as 
expression.169 In Humanitarian Law Project, however, free-speech 
values were threatened to a greater extent because it was the 
nonprofit’s planned expressive activity itself—that is, its 
communication of information through the expressive activity of 
teaching—that gave rise to the very “material support” that the statute 
banned in its application to the case.170 Thus, the Court concluded, the 
material-support statute imposed a direct-in-effect, not just incidental, 
burden on this particular would-be speaker.171 This conclusion, in turn, 
led the Court to apply a mode of review to the as-applied challenge 
that was “more demanding” than the intermediate-scrutiny approach 
of O’Brien.172 In the end, the Court in Humanitarian Law Project 
upheld the challenged statute—hardly a surprising result because the 
justification underlying the statute focused on the distinctly powerful 
government interest of thwarting international terrorism. The key 
point here, however, is that the Court was crystal clear in holding that 
 
 165. Id. at 26.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 27. 
 168. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968) (cited in Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. at 26–27). 
 169. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82. 
 170. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27–28. 
 171. See id. at 4 (reasoning that “the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consist[ed] 
of communicating a message”). 
 172. Id. at 27–28. Notably, this approach was far from unprecedented. In Humanitarian Law 
Project itself, the Court relied on earlier cases involving close scrutiny of breach-of-the-peace 
statutes as applied to protected speech. See id. (discussing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971)). 
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the type of as-applied challenge raised in such cases requires a much 
stricter form of judicial scrutiny than was operative in O’Brien. 
Thus, a critical question arises: When courts apply the rules of 
evidence to allow a defendant’s past profession of radical political 
beliefs or the like to be presented to the jury, are those rules operating 
more like the draft-card-burning law at issue in O’Brien or more like 
the material-support statute at issue in Humanitarian Law Project? The 
answer is that evidence rules are operating more like the material-
support statute. After all, just as in Humanitarian Law Project, the 
Government in past-speech-evidence cases seeks to use against 
defendants the expressive characteristics of their past speech. In other 
words, the speaker-disadvantaging impact generated by the 
problematic evidence arises precisely because of—and not, as in 
O’Brien, in spite of—the fact that the defendant’s actions involve 
communicating particular information or ideas to others. Thus, when 
the Government uses past-speech evidence against a defendant-
declarant, it is doing so specifically because of “the content . . . of the 
message conveyed,”173 in the critical sense that “the content of the 
message” is precisely what gives the message probative power for the 
prosecutor’s case. The burden placed on speakers through the 
evidentiary use of their past speech is therefore far different—because 
it is far more direct—than the burden placed on the speaker in O’Brien. 
It thus seems fair to conclude that past-speech-evidence cases call for 
an even-more-than-intermediate-scrutiny mode of constitutional 
review, in keeping with the logic of Humanitarian Law Project. 
C. Past-Speech Evidence and Sherbert 
Both O’Brien and Humanitarian Law Project show that limits on 
the ability to challenge generally applicable laws on constitutional 
grounds do not apply to Free Speech Clause cases. But even if Smith 
were taken to immunize generally applicable laws from free-exercise 
and free-speech challenges, the Smith Court itself recognized an 
important exception to the rule of immunity it established. This 
exception emanated from the Court’s earlier free-exercise ruling in 
Sherbert v. Verner. And, as the following discussion indicates, the 
policy concerns that drove the Smith Court to recognize the Sherbert 
exception apply with great force in the past-speech-evidence context 
considered in this Article. 
 
 173. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 457 (2011). 
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Sherbert arose out of a sincere Sabbatarian’s free-exercise 
challenge to the state’s refusal to grant her unemployment-
compensation benefits after she lost her job because she refused to 
work on Saturdays.174 The State argued that the case presented no free-
exercise problem because refusals to work for “personal reasons,” 
whether religious or not, precluded the award of unemployment 
benefits.175 In other words, the State’s theory was that Ms. Sherbert 
could not mount a free-exercise challenge to the program’s eligibility 
rules because of their generally applicable character. 
In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court disagreed, 
reasoning that “any incidental burden on the free exercise of 
appellant’s religion” must be “justified by a ‘compelling state 
interest.’”176 Twenty-seven years later, the Court had the chance to 
overrule Sherbert in Smith. But it declined to do so. Instead, the Court 
concluded that its newly minted prohibition on free-exercise scrutiny 
of generally applicable laws did not extend to Sherbert-like cases.177 
According to Justice Scalia, this exception to the Smith rule made sense 
because “the Sherbert test . . . was developed in a context that lent itself 
to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the 
relevant conduct.”178 In other words, state decisionmakers had to 
consider, as a matter of state law, a variety of “eligibility criteria” in 
connection with “the particular circumstances behind an applicant’s 
unemployment” in each individual case.179 In sum, Sherbert, as recast 
in Smith, establishes the principle that “where the State has in place a 
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that 
system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”180 
Smith’s treatment of Sherbert raises an important question: Even 
assuming that evidence rules might otherwise be subject to Smith’s 
line-in-the-sand limit on First Amendment challenges to generally 
applicable laws, does the Smith limit or the Sherbert exception to that 
 
 174. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).  
 175. Id. at 419 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. at 403 (citation omitted). 
 177. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990). 
 178. Id. at 884. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (citation omitted). Notably, lower courts have applied the Sherbert exception in a 
wide range of settings far removed from the unemployment-compensation context. See, e.g., Ward 
v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 738 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying such an exception to a university policy 
regarding counselor reassignments); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of 
Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the exception to a police-department policy 
that banned beards).  
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limit properly apply when defendants challenge prosecutorial use of 
past-speech evidence? The answer to this question hinges on the policy 
concerns that underlie the Court’s treatment of Sherbert in Smith. And 
those policy concerns favor recognition of an analogous “expressive 
hardship” exception to otherwise generally applicable rules of 
evidence. 
To begin with, if determinations made by the government ever 
“invite consideration of the particular circumstances” or “an 
individualized governmental assessment . . . of reasons,”181 they do so 
in the context of judicial rulings on the admissibility of evidence. After 
all, each and every evidentiary ruling is uniquely based on the 
particular evidence offered and the overall context into which it fits. In 
addition, the law of evidence establishes “eligibility criteria” in a key, 
functional sense. For relevant evidence to be eligible for admission 
under the Federal Rules, for example, it must not be unduly 
prejudicial, must be nonprivileged, and must not be subject to 
exclusion as hearsay or improper character evidence. 
Indeed, a straightforward logical argument is available based on 
the Court’s declaration in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah,182 building on Smith and Sherbert, that a state “may not 
refuse . . . without compelling reason” to recognize a constitutional 
hardship exception “in circumstances in which individualized 
exemptions from a general requirement are available.”183 In the past-
speech-evidence context, a “general requirement” dictates that 
relevant evidence is admissible. But there exist many “individualized 
exemptions” to that rule that are triggered by privileges, hearsay limits, 
and the like. Thus, it seems to follow that courts “may not refuse” to 
apply a First Amendment exception to the relevance rule “without 
compelling reason.”184 
What is more, there is a special justification for carrying over 
Sherbert’s “individual government assessment” principle to past-
speech-evidence cases. In these cases, courts are very likely to find 
themselves assessing the prejudicial effect of the proffered speech 
evidence in any event. In our bombing hypothetical, for example, the 
defendant almost certainly would lodge an objection based on “unfair 
prejudice” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (or its state-law 
 
 181. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 182. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 183. Id. at 537 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 184. Id. (citation omitted). 
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counterpart), so that the trial court would have to assess the risk of such 
prejudice under background principles of evidence law.185 Against this 
backdrop, and in light of the Sherbert exception, it seems especially 
improper to preclude consideration of constitutional prejudice as part 
of the court’s admissibility assessment. After all, when judges are 
already considering the prejudicial effects of proffered evidence, it 
hardly seems too meddlesome to call on them to take account—just as 
the Court did in Sherbert—of the specialized First Amendment 
considerations at work in the case. And this conclusion seems all the 
more sound in light of the judicial branch’s longstanding role—and 
resulting specialized competence—in standing above the political fray 
to safeguard free-speech values. 
As with O’Brien and Humanitarian Law Project, there may be 
reasons to conclude that the principle of Sherbert does not obviously 
control prosecutorial attempts to use past-speech evidence. But the 
policy-based thematic drift of Sherbert as refined in Smith—that it is 
proper to include constitutional considerations in decision-making 
processes focused on “particular circumstances”—bears directly on the 
set of problems addressed in this Article. The policy of Sherbert 
supports the conclusion that courts should engage with—rather than 
ignore—Free Speech Clause values as they make “individualized 
governmental assessment[s]” in evaluating objections to past-speech 
evidence. 
D. Past-Speech Evidence and First Amendment Due Process 
The preceding discussion reveals that the policies underlying the 
Court’s work with generally applicable laws—including its decisions in 
O’Brien, Humanitarian Law Project, Sherbert, and even Smith—
support the imposition of meaningful First Amendment limits on 
prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence. Some analysts, however, 
might try to push these cases to one side by claiming that substantive 
legal restrictions and procedural rules of evidence necessarily fall into 
separate juridical categories. This view of things is dubious from the 
start because “thoughtful legal observers have recognized that there is 
no bright line between procedure and substance in whatever legal 
context one encounters the dichotomy.”186 But even if one embraces 
such a distinction with all-out enthusiasm, there is a powerful reason 
 
 185. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 186. Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and 
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1926–27 (2006).  
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not to exempt evidence law from Free Speech Clause challenges based 
on that law’s generally applicable character. The reason stems from 
another set of constitutional limits—focused squarely on procedural, 
rather than substantive, law—that rein in the operation of many 
generally applicable rules. These limits center on what Professor Henry 
P. Monaghan famously calls “First Amendment due process.”187 As the 
label suggests, this doctrine draws simultaneously on substance-
centered free-speech values and non-substance-centered procedural 
due process values.188  
Consider New York Times v. Sullivan.189 In that case, the Court 
held that speech about public officials cannot support a defamation 
action unless the defendant acts with “actual malice.”190 But the Court 
did not stop there. It also held that the burden of proof as to actual 
malice must rest on public-official plaintiffs and that those plaintiffs 
must prove such malice with “convincing clarity.”191 Obviously, state 
laws that provide for a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of 
proof are generally applicable in nature. After all, that standard applies 
routinely in tort actions—indeed, in almost all civil actions of any 
kind.192 The Court in Sullivan, however, threw the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard out the window. Relying on the First 
 
 187. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 
518 (1970) (discussing procedural safeguards intended to limit the harm of governmental action 
that impedes First Amendment rights). 
 188. As a result, the doctrine of First Amendment due process may get a lift from an aspect 
of Smith that is entirely separate from the Smith Court’s treatment of Sherbert. In particular, the 
Court recognized that its approach of insulating generally applicable laws from constitutional 
challenges should sometimes give way in cases that involve the “hybrid” operation of two separate 
constitutional protections. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. This line of analysis seems fully applicable 
here because constitutional limits based on First Amendment due process, by their nature, stem 
from a hybrid right rooted in the joint operation of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause and 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To be sure, some scholars 
might challenge judicial recognition of hybrid rights on textualist grounds. In particular, they 
might claim that such hybridization is inconsistent with the Constitution’s textual structure of 
setting forth what seem to be separate, freestanding safeguards of individual rights. In the context 
of past-speech evidence, however, this textualist critique has little force. In Roaden v. Kentucky, 
413 U.S. 496 (1973), the Court, in applying the Fourth Amendment, declared that “we examine 
what is ‘unreasonable’ in the light of the values of freedom of expression.” Id. at 504. It seems no 
less appropriate to say courts should likewise look at those same “values of freedom of 
expression” in determining what process is “due” as they evaluate the adequacy of government-
specified procedural rules, including the rules of evidence. See id. 
 189. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 190. Id. at 279–80. 
 191. Id. at 285–86. 
 192. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5122, at 399 (2d ed. 2005). 
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Amendment, the Court compelled states to depart from this generally 
applicable procedural rule to ensure that free-expression values 
receive the level of protection that the Constitution requires.193 
One might say that Sullivan sheds little light on the subject of past-
speech evidence because that case concerned only the distinctly 
speech-centered subject of defamation law. This reasoning is faulty, 
however, because the Court has invoked the Free Speech Clause to 
require departures from generally applicable rules of procedure in a 
broad array of rulings,194 including many rulings that have nothing to 
do with the law of defamation.195 In cases of particular relevance here, 
for example, the Court has wielded the tool of First Amendment due 
process to require appellate tribunals to review trial court findings de 
novo, regardless of the review standard put in place by generally 
applicable procedural rules.196 In light of these authorities, it is not 
 
 193. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86 (noting that “the constitutional standard demands” 
imposition of the “convincing clarity” formulation). 
 194. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (plurality opinion) (noting that “we 
have often held some procedures . . . to be constitutionally required in proceedings that may 
penalize protected speech” (citations omitted)); Faulkner, supra note 5, at 13, 21 (noting that First 
Amendment due process applies in “numerous areas”); see also Carroll v. President & Comm’rs 
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968) (imposing more exacting rules than otherwise would 
apply regarding the issuance of temporary restraining orders when they target parades or similar 
free-speech activities); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–60 (1965) (holding that a film-
licensing system avoids “constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards 
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system,” including by ensuring expedited judicial 
review); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (requiring heightened particularity in 
warrants when the materials to be seized are speech related); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 
U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (requiring special procedural rules regarding state control of obscenity); Marcus 
v. 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 731–33 (1961) (imposing special requirements for warrants 
regarding seizures of speech-related materials). In the same vein are rulings that apply First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which alters traditional jurisdictional rules of standing. See 
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991) 
(discussing various ways the judicial system has dealt with statutes that are overly broad in the 
conduct they regulate). 
 195. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (adopting 
burden-of-proof-shifting methodology to deal with mixed-motive speech cases); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (imposing the burden of proof on the Government when 
dissident taxpayer-speakers were denied tax exemptions); see also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 
290, 299–300 (1961) (requiring judicial assessment of proof of a defendant’s membership in an 
organization “strictissimi juris” to ensure that the defendant is not “punished for his adherence to 
[that organization’s] lawful and constitutionally protected purposes because of [the 
organization’s] other and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share”); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (requiring “clear proof” of the defendant’s specific intent 
not just to join a revolutionary organization but also to accomplish its unlawful aims). 
 196. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (requiring use 
of de novo review “in reviewing a determination of actual malice”); Yates v. United States, 354 
U.S. 298, 328 (1957) (endorsing “rigorous standards of review” in incitement-related Smith Act 
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surprising that other analysts—including Professor Quint—focus their 
attention on First Amendment due process principles in urging courts 
to place free-expression-based limits on prosecutorial use of past-
speech evidence.197  
There is much merit in this approach. But analysts who have relied 
on it have failed to note that there is an analytical fly in the ointment. 
The problem is that it is one thing to say that courts can override 
generally applicable procedural rules, but it is a very different thing to 
say that courts must do so—or even that they must think hard about 
doing so.198 This point takes on a sharper focus when one recalls that 
the principle of First Amendment due process differs in a significant 
way from the principles laid down in O’Brien, Humanitarian Law 
Project, and Sherbert. If a challenged government action falls within 
the reach of those three precedents, after all, it automatically triggers 
specialized scrutiny; indeed, if either Humanitarian Law Project or 
Sherbert applies with full force, the challenged government action is 
subject to the strictest form of constitutional review. 
The law of First Amendment due process, however, operates 
differently because there are large numbers of generally applicable 
procedural rules that apply equally (and noncontroversially) in both 
free-speech-related and other cases. Courts, for example, have never 
professed to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny—or, indeed, any level 
of First Amendment scrutiny at all—to civil pleading requirements, 
jury selection procedures, the requisite level of jury consensus, 
indictment-specificity rules, or the probable-cause charging 
requirement, even when the case centers on speech-related activity. 
The key point is that many procedural rules have never been 
understood to trigger elevated as-applied Free Speech Clause review. 
Put another way, if a First Amendment overlay on generally applicable 
rules of evidence were to find its moorings in authorities such as 
Sullivan, that overlay would require a special singling out of the law of 
evidence because the Court’s past rulings have created only a here-
 
prosecutions). 
 197. Quint, supra note 2, at 1641; accord Faulkner, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that “because 
First Amendment rights are particularly susceptible to infringement, the Court has been willing 
to adopt extraordinary procedural safeguards” in an effort to safeguard those rights). 
 198. Professor Quint, for example, seems to gloss over this point when he claims, without 
qualification, that “procedural guarantees must be applied with special strictness when First 
Amendment rights are at stake.” See Quint, supra note 2, at 1641. 
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and-there, exceptional-situation, hodge-podge set of First Amendment 
due process limits.199 
This is not to say that there is no basis for recognizing a First 
Amendment due process limit on generally applicable evidence law. 
Far from it.200 It is to say, however, that proponents of this approach 
must justify Free Speech Clause policing of the generally applicable 
rules of evidence with an argument that reaches beyond simply uttering 
the mantra of “First Amendment due process.” Is that possible? Many 
past rulings of the Court signal that it is. Most notably: 
1. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, courts must exempt from 
the general application of antitrust statutes collective efforts by 
otherwise competing businesses to secure jointly self-serving changes 
in the law.201 In Footnote 3 of United Mine Workers v. Pennington,202 
the Court noted that this principle would not necessarily preclude the 
use of evidence of such collective efforts as part of an effort to prove 
the defendant’s engagement in more nefarious forms of collusion, such 
as price-fixing.203 But the Court also observed that it would “be within 
the province of the trial judge to admit this evidence, if he deemed it 
probative and not unduly prejudicial.”204 This passage thus supports the 
imposition of a prejudice-based First Amendment limit on use of past-
speech evidence, even if the evidence is deemed relevant.205 
2. In Abrams v. United States,206 the Court upheld the convictions 
of five defendants under the Espionage Act for disseminating 
pamphlets containing “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive” statements 
 
 199. Waters, 511 U.S. at 670–71 (plurality opinion) (noting that “not every procedure that may 
safeguard protected speech is constitutionally mandated”; that “[w]e have never set forth a 
general test to determine when a procedural safeguard is required”; that only “some procedural 
requirements” are mandated by the First Amendment; and that “[n]one of us have discovered a 
general principle to determine where this line is to be drawn”). 
 200. Professor Quint, for example, argues that the Sullivan burden-of-proof rule supports “a 
stringent rule of exclusion” in past-speech-evidence cases because of the “more compelling” 
individual interests at stake in criminal, as opposed to civil, proceedings. Quint, supra note 2, at 
1660 & n.132. 
 201. See, e.g., Faulkner, supra note 5, at 29–30 (citations omitted). 
 202. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
 203. Id. at 670 n.3. 
 204. Id. (emphasis added). 
 205. See Feminist Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7 (5th Cir. 
1978) (deeming evidence properly excluded based on “prejudice” concerns under Footnote 3, 
given “the defendants’ [F]irst [A]mendment interests”).  
 206. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
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about the nation’s involvement in World War I.207 The case, however, 
has since come to stand for the libertarian views expressed in the 
“classic” opinion of the great dissenter, Justice Holmes.208 Holmes’s 
analysis focused on the idea that the defendants’ words did not rise to 
the level of proscribable incitement.209 In a little-noticed sentence 
regarding the defendants’ past statements, however, Justice Holmes 
also asserted that “no one has a right even to consider [them] in dealing 
with the charges before the Court.”210 And a principle under which “no 
one has a right even to consider” a defendant’s past protected speech 
signals that, at least in some cases, such speech may not be used as 
evidence. 
3. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee211 arose 
out of a legislative committee’s effort to require the presentation of 
evidence—namely, an official listing of a local NAACP branch’s 
members—in connection with an investigation of ties between that 
organization and the Communist Party.212 After an NAACP official 
refused to supply this material, he was held in contempt.213 The Court, 
however, overturned the imposition of this penalty, stating that “it is 
an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which 
intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, 
press, association and petition that the State convincingly show a 
substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of 
overriding and compelling state interest.”214 The Court went on to 
declare that “the Committee has not ‘demonstrated so cogent an 
interest in obtaining and making public’ the membership information  
. . . as to ‘justify the [threatened] substantial abridgment of 
associational freedom.’”215 Plainly, judicial proceedings, no less than 
legislative proceedings, can “intrude[] into the area of constitutional 
rights”—indeed, intrude so greatly that they deprive the defendant of 
life or liberty. And so, it is hard to see why similar prosecutorial efforts 
 
 207. Id. at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 208. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 469 n.51 (1985). 
 209. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. at 630. 
 211. Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
 212. Id. at 540–42. 
 213. Id. at 543. 
 214. Id. at 546. 
 215. Id. (citation omitted). 
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to elicit evidence of public-concern speech should not be subject to the 
same sort of speech-sensitive judicial balancing that the Court 
endorsed in Gibson.216 
4. As Professor Quint details, the Court has invoked First 
Amendment due process principles to install specialized constitutional 
rules in free-speech cases, not only as to the required quantum of 
evidence, as in Sullivan, but also as to the minimum sufficiency of 
evidence.217 Although these rulings technically do not concern the 
admissibility of evidence, they operate to strip evidence of the 
probative effect it otherwise would have.218 As common sense suggests, 
rules that deprive evidence of probative significance are little different, 
as a practical matter, from rules that exclude evidence from 
consideration by the factfinder. Accordingly, the recognition of First 
Amendment due process limits in the former context lends support to 
the recognition of similar limits in the latter. 
5. In Branzburg v. Hayes,219 Justice Powell—in supplying the 
decisive fifth vote in support of the majority’s ruling—endorsed a First 
Amendment balancing rule designed to override the generally 
applicable principle that permits grand juries to require the 
presentation of all relevant evidence.220 More specifically, he concluded 
 
 216. See Quint, supra note 2, at 1663 n.142 (detailing why, because of what is at stake in each, 
“the First Amendment interest is, if anything stronger” when past-speech evidence is offered in 
criminal proceedings than in legislative proceedings); see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 933 
(emphasizing the particularly “great” speech-burdening effect when challenged evidence “may 
be responsible for a conviction”).  
 217. See, e.g., Quint, supra note 2, at 1654 (discussing the Noto and Scales cases and the 
“unusually rigorous” proof requirements they impose for demonstrating constitutionally required 
specific-intent requirements); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366 (2003) (rejecting an 
evidentiary presumption that drew an inference of intent to intimidate from expressive action 
standing alone). Notably, lower courts have built on these precedents in speech-protective ways. 
See Quint, supra note 2, at 1656 (discussing the First Circuit’s Spock case as displacing generally 
applicable “restrictions on the sufficiency of the evidence to impose special First Amendment 
limitations”); id. at 1654–55 (reflecting similarly on the Ninth Circuit’s Hellman decision). 
 218. In particular, these cases suggest that, absent free-speech concerns, level of evidence A 
would be sufficient to convict, but that because the Free Speech Clause is in the picture, a higher 
level of evidence—say, A plus B—is required. The practical effect of such a rule is to render 
ineffectual any body of evidence less than A plus B. In particular, evidence A standing alone—
even if it is so probative that it would take the case to the jury under ordinary circumstances—is 
deemed to have no probative effect at all, entirely because of the force exerted by the First 
Amendment.  
 219. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 220. See Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1951, 1951, 1954 (2006) (arguing that Justice Powell’s endorsement of a balancing test embodies 
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that when significant free-speech concerns present themselves—as 
when a reporter seeks to avoid disclosing the name of a confidential 
source—the judge must “strik[e] . . . a proper balance between freedom 
of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant 
testimony . . . on a case-by-case basis.”221 Again, the analogy to cases 
involving prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence is apparent. If the 
Government must run the gauntlet of a speech-protective balancing 
test when it seeks to compel the presentation of relevant evidence 
merely to a grand jury, simple logic suggests that it should have to do 
no less when it seeks to compel the presentation of such evidence in 
the criminal trial itself.222 
6. Finally, the Court’s ruling in Dawson supports the endorsement 
of a meaningful judicial role in policing evidentiary use of public-
concern speech. To be sure, the focal point of the Court’s reasoning in 
Dawson was that the challenged evidence lacked relevance to the 
issues under consideration by the jury. On the better view, however, 
the Court required something more than ordinary evidentiary 
relevance,223 while also emphasizing the prejudicial nature of the 
challenged Aryan Brotherhood proof, which focused on the 
defendant’s “morally reprehensible” beliefs.224 In any event, judicial 
endorsement of a constitutional rule that ties exclusion of past-speech 
evidence solely to a finding of relevance makes little, if any, sense as a 
matter of First Amendment policy. It is, after all, the presence of a 
prejudicial impact on the exercise of free-speech rights—and not the 
problem of evidentiary irrelevance—that gives rise to a First 
Amendment problem in past-speech-evidence cases in the first place.225 
 
the holding in Branzburg because he supplied the critical fifth vote). 
 221. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Nickerson, supra note 6, at 
846 (noting that “most appellate circuits have adopted the case-by-case approach” of Justice 
Powell).  
 222. See Quint, supra note 2, at 1664 (noting that “the First Amendment interests favoring 
exclusion of a defendant’s protected speech at trial seem substantially stronger than the interests 
favoring exclusion of similar material from consideration by the grand jury” because of the 
prospect of actual conviction at trial).  
 223. See Faulkner, supra note 5, at 42 (arguing that Dawson required that “evidence must be 
really relevant to be admitted over a First Amendment objection” and that “the conclusion of 
irrelevance in Dawson was a fiction”); id. at 40 n.233 (describing Dawson as involving “supra-
normal relevance scrutiny”); Nickerson, supra note 6, at 859 n.76 (same). 
 224. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992); see Faulkner, supra note 5, at 38 (noting 
that while Dawson “ostensibly rested on relevance grounds, its holding of ‘constitutional error’ 
can only be explained in terms of prejudice”). 
 225. See supra notes 58, 107–09 and accompanying text. 
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In addition, a relevance-only approach to admissibility would invite 
odd and troubling results. In particular, such an approach might well 
foreclose the use of irrelevant past-speech proof that presents only 
limited dangers of free-expression-related prejudice, while allowing 
the use of only marginally relevant evidence even when it presents the 
most far-reaching dangers of free-expression-related prejudice. Simply 
put, it is strange—if not anomalous—to reject the weighing of 
evidentiary prejudice in this First Amendment context when it is that 
very prejudice that alone brings the First Amendment into play.226 
At the very least, Dawson swept away a key argument against 
recognition of First Amendment limits on past-speech evidence—
namely, the argument that any particular application of the rules of 
evidence is rightly exempt from challenge under the Free Speech 
Clause because of those rules’ generally applicable nature. This is the 
case because the Delaware courts had concluded—with good reason—
that the Aryan Brotherhood proof that the Supreme Court deemed 
inadmissible under the Free Speech Clause was relevant under the 
generally applicable rules of state evidence law.227 Accordingly, with 
Dawson, the horse is out of the barn. There no longer can be doubt 
that there exist some First Amendment limits on otherwise operative 
general rules of evidence law. Thus, courts must recognize and define 
those limits, and they must do so with underlying First Amendment 
policies in mind. 
E. Potential Counterarguments 
The foregoing discussion supports three conclusions. First, 
arguments for broadly rejecting constitutional challenges to the 
admission of past-speech evidence based on cases such as Haupt, 
Dawson, and Mitchell, or based on the general applicability of rules of 
evidence, are not sustainable. Second, constitutional precedent and 
policy—including with regard to the proper evaluation of generally 
applicable laws—support recognition of a meaningful judicial role in 
policing the use of past-speech evidence. Third, any such meaningful 
assessment must thoughtfully take into account not only the relevance 
of proffered past-speech evidence, but also its potential prejudicial 
effects. 
 
 226. See Faulkner, supra note 5, at 9 (finding “reason to suppose that a majority [in Dawson] 
would embrace a balancing approach which would flexibly protect First Amendment values”). 
 227. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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Others may well look to find missteps in this line of analysis. They 
might claim, in particular, that the argument misuses precedent, 
wrongly minimizes vital government interests, invites undue 
uncertainty, or ignores key features of free-expression theory. This 
Section addresses each of these potential critiques. 
1. Precedent.  As to precedent, skeptics might argue that the 
authority-based arguments set forth above seek to place square pegs in 
round holes. On this view, the question presented by prosecutorial use 
of past-speech evidence is far removed from the questions dealt with 
in O’Brien, Humanitarian Law Project, and Sherbert because those 
cases involved substantive legal restrictions, not “just” the use of 
speech as part of the Government’s effort to prove the defendant’s 
guilt.228 These critics might add that the Court in those cases subjected 
challenged laws to traditional forms of means-ends analysis that are not 
well suited for use by courts as they go about making contextual 
judgments about the admissibility of evidence.229 To say that neither 
O’Brien nor Humanitarian Law Project nor Sherbert is directly 
controlling in past-speech-evidence cases, however, is to miss the key 
point—namely, that the analytical grounding of each of these 
precedents suggests that courts must do more than pay mere lip service 
to free-speech values in this context. And this takeaway gains still more 
strength when one considers these precedents as a collective whole, 
together with the Court’s highly libertarian jurisprudence regarding 
speech on matters of public concern. In sum, the gravitational pull of 
the Court’s existing Free Speech Clause jurisprudence is powerful in 
this context, and it suggests that courts must assess in a meaningful way 
First Amendment objections to prosecutorial use of past-speech 
evidence. 
2. Policy.  Skeptics might also make arguments of policy. They 
could assert, for example, that admitting past-speech evidence at trial 
is important because it is probative, often on matters that are otherwise 
 
 228. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 229. Complexity rears its head, in part, because judges cannot vindicate First Amendment 
values in the context of past-speech evidence in one fell swoop. They cannot, for example, craft 
the sort of bright-line solution used in Sherbert, where the Court announced that all sincere 
Sabbatarians simply cannot be, on that basis, excluded from receiving workers-compensation 
benefits. See supra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert). But that hardly 
means that courts cannot deal with First Amendment evidence problems just as they deal with 
other objections to concededly relevant evidence—that is, by taking account of both evidentiary 
relevance and competing values. 
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difficult to prove, such as the defendant’s state of mind. These skeptics 
might add that judges, if given the chance, would afford too much 
weight to free-speech-related “prejudice,” thus frustrating the state’s 
vital interest in securing proper criminal convictions. These points, 
however, are overdrawn. Any proper judicial assessment of past-
speech evidence necessarily would involve judicial consideration not 
only of potential prejudicial effects, but also of the probative value of 
the evidence and of prosecutorial needs, with the consequence that 
much, if not most, past-speech evidence would be admitted. Judges are 
trusted in other contexts to apply evidence rules in a fair-minded 
fashion. There is, accordingly, no sound reason to conclude that these 
same judges would suddenly fall into a misplaced mindset that fixates 
myopically on the risk of prejudicial effects when asked to apply 
constitutional limits to the use of past-speech evidence. 
3. Predictability.  Critics might advance another objection—
namely, that the contextual weighing of the costs and benefits of past-
speech evidence, under some inevitably fuzzy First Amendment rule, 
would unduly complicate evidence law and add a new layer of 
complexity to the already-challenging adjudication of criminal cases. 
The premise of this argument is shaky. For example, as previously 
noted, federal courts already must engage in the trial-complicating 
balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice when they apply 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to all sorts of evidence. Enriching this 
analysis to take special account of free-speech concerns—and doing so 
only in the discrete set of cases involving speech on matters of public 
concern—thus does not seem to be a game-changer in terms of 
administrative tribulations. There is a deeper point, too. Time and 
again, the Court has indicated that when vital constitutional interests 
are at stake, concerns about “administrative convenience” must give 
way.230 Even more fundamentally, the great mass of constitutional law 
supports a basic proposition of overarching salience here—the goal of 
protecting core constitutional rights is not to be sacrificed on an altar 
built of easy-to-apply rules.231 
 
 230. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (noting 
that “the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency”); Carey 
v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977) (“[T]he prospect of additional administrative 
inconvenience has not been thought to justify invasion of fundamental constitutional rights.”); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (rejecting “administrative ease and convenience as 
sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-based classifications”). 
 231. See, e.g., Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 606 (1989) (“It is perhaps 
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Indeed, in a seminal public-concern-speech case, Connick v. 
Myers,232 the Court emphatically endorsed a context-specific—and 
frustratingly tough-to-administer—balancing approach. There, the 
Court confronted the question whether a terminated public employee 
can succeed on a First Amendment claim when the firing allegedly 
resulted in part from her engagement in public-concern speech.233 The 
Court declared that deciding such a case requires an analysis that 
includes “full consideration of the government’s interest,”234 as well as 
the precise “nature of the employee’s expression”235 and “the context” 
in which the government decided to act.236 Also significant is whether 
the speech “touched upon matters of public concern in only a most 
limited sense”237 or involved such matters “more substantially.”238 The 
Court acknowledged that “such particularized balancing is difficult,”239 
but it also insisted that a more wooden approach was unacceptable in 
light of “the enormous variety of fact situations” that such cases 
present.240 As with public-concern speech in the public-employee 
context, so too with public-concern speech that the Government seeks 
to use as evidence. In both settings, judges can and “must reach the 
most appropriate possible balance of the competing interests”241 after 
taking account of “the whole record.”242 
 
unfortunate, but nonetheless inevitable, that the broad language of many clauses within the Bill 
of Rights must be translated into adjudicatory principles that realize their full meaning only after 
their application to a series of concrete cases.”).  
 232. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 233. Id. at 141–42. 
 234. Id. at 150. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 153–54. 
 237. Id. at 154. 
 238. Id. at 152. 
 239. Id. at 150. 
 240. Id. at 154 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)). 
 241. Id. at 150. 
 242. Id. at 148. In a post-Connick ruling that again concerned speech on matters of public 
concern, a four-Justice plurality even more pointedly explained that while “lack of [a more 
particularized] test is inconvenient, . . . this does not relieve us of our responsibility to decide the 
case”; the result is that courts must “answer[] the question on a case-by-case basis.” Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994). Indeed, there are special reasons to say that courts should 
carry over a Connick-like balancing approach to past-speech-evidence cases. First, public 
employees choose to be public employees—and thus to assume the speech-related limits that 
attend that role. Criminal defendants, in contrast, do not choose to be criminal defendants. 
Second, in endorsing judicial balancing in cases such as Connick, the Justices have emphasized 
the difference between government action as an “employer” (with concomitantly greater 
authority to manage speech) and as a “sovereign” (with concomitantly lesser authority to manage 
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4. Free-Speech Theory.  Finally, those who favor insulating 
evidence law from free-speech-based attacks might seek to leverage 
the prior work of First Amendment theorists, most notably then-
Professor and now-Justice Elena Kagan. According to Justice Kagan’s 
pre-appointment scholarship, free-speech doctrine should center not 
so much on guarding against the speech-burdening effects of 
government actions as on policing the government’s impermissible 
speech-suppressive motives.243 Building on this theme, analysts might 
reason that the framers of the Federal Rules of Evidence and kindred 
bodies of state law obviously did not act with the motive of targeting 
unpopular speakers. It follows, so the argument goes, that the 
introduction of past-speech evidence merits no special judicial 
attention, regardless of any speech-burdening impact that evidence 
might produce in any particular case. 
One problem with this analysis is that controversy surrounds the 
effort to cast free-speech law as properly centered on addressing 
improper government motives. Indeed, many scholars have argued 
that real-world effects, as opposed to government purposes, should 
take center stage in First Amendment analysis.244 Justice Kagan herself 
 
speech). Id. at 671–74. Without question, when the State marshals evidence in a criminal 
prosecution, it is acting not as an employer, but as a sovereign. See Nickerson, supra note 6, at 
885–86 (noting the special claim for case-by-case assessments when criminal subpoenas or civil 
discovery orders involve the surrender of evidence concerning speech on matters of public 
concern). Perhaps most importantly, the Court already has recognized the need to engage in a 
“case by case” analysis of the operation of generally applicable evidence rules to ensure the 
proper operation of constitutional fundamental rights. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 141, § 11.3 
(noting that the Supreme Court has taken an “ad hoc” and “case-specific” approach to 
determining, pursuant to a “balancing test” with an “as-applied nature,” whether generally 
applicable rules of evidence law must give way because of the constitutional right of 
confrontation); Nagareda, supra note 141, at 1067–81 (describing the Court’s approach in this 
area as requiring “case-by-case,” “ad hoc,” and “as applied” assessments). For illustrative cases, 
see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (holding that because of the right of defendants to 
testify on their own behalf, the generally applicable state bans on hypnotically refreshed 
testimony must give way, so long as particular “circumstances present an argument of 
admissibility”), Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (refusing to apply hearsay law 
“mechanistically,” and instead requiring attentiveness to “the circumstances of the particular 
case”), and Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (stating that “no fixed rule” controls 
the constitutional inquiry and calling instead for “balancing” based on “the particular 
circumstances of each case”). 
 243. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 414 (asserting that free-speech law’s “primary, though 
unstated, object” is “the discovery of improper governmental motives”); see also Srikanth 
Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based 
Rationalization of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401, 418 (1995).  
 244. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1175, 1179 (1996) (advocating an effects-based approach under which “laws having the incidental 
effect of substantially burdening fundamental rights to engage in primary conduct should be 
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acknowledged that effects-based analysis has driven some significant 
features of free-speech doctrine.245 And most important of all, the 
Court itself has pointedly declared that the “abridgement of [free-
expression] rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from 
varied forms of government actions.”246 
In any event, even under a purpose-centered view of the Free 
Speech Clause, there is an overwhelming difficulty with opposing a rule 
of contextual judicial assessments of past-speech evidence. The 
difficulty arises because—as even Justice Kagan notes— impermissible 
speech-punishing motives oftentimes lie not in the enactment of laws, 
but in their application.247 And courts properly have devised many 
“prophylactic” constitutional rules to ensure that impermissible 
government purposes do not lead to the harming of protected 
speakers.248 Adopting such a protective rule in the past-speech-
evidence context seems especially justifiable because, as previously 
shown, the risk is acute that juries confronted with this evidence will 
latch onto it precisely (and improperly) because the defendant’s 
statements veer away from conventional norms.249 No less important, 
if courts are to deal with this danger, they have no choice but to do so 
by employing a prophylactic, pre-admission policing mechanism. Why? 
Because even if juror motives were otherwise readily subject to 
discovery—which they are not—post-trial challenges to verdicts are 
precluded by settled rules that broadly prohibit the second-guessing of 
juror thought processes and discussions.250 In sum, a purpose-centered 
 
subject to heightened scrutiny”); see also Kagan, supra note 72, at 413 (acknowledging that “most 
descriptive . . . as well as most normative discussions of [First Amendment] doctrine . . . focus[] 
on the effects of a given regulation”). 
 245. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 427. 
 246. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (emphasis added); see 
also Waters, 511 U.S. at 670 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“[T]he First Amendment creates 
a strong presumption against punishing protected speech even inadvertently . . . .”); Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (“[O]ur cases 
have consistently held that ‘[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the 
First Amendment.’” (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 592 (1983))). 
 247. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 457, 459, 462–63.  
 248. Id. at 457. 
 249. See supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text. 
 250. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1). Leading cases barring such inquiries include Tanner v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 107, 115–16 (1987) (precluding efforts to secure evidence that jury 
members consumed large quantities of alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, or some combination thereof 
to the point that service on the jury was “one big party”) and Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 
525–26 (2014) (blocking testimony about jury deliberations even when offered to show that a 
panel member lied during voir dire, in part because this result comported with the majority of 
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conception of free-speech theory supports, rather than undermines, a 
constitutional requirement that trial judges engage in meaningful pre-
admission assessments when prosecutors offer past-speech evidence. 
A foundational aspect of free-speech policy confirms the 
correctness of this approach. At the heart of First Amendment law lies 
the idea that speakers should not suffer government-imposed burdens 
because of the viewpoints they express.251 Yet the risk of penalizing 
speakers on this prohibited basis is at a high ebb in past-speech-
evidence cases because, as illustrated by the hypothetical bomber case, 
the defendant may end up being convicted precisely because of the 
repugnance of the viewpoint the defendant has espoused.252 In short, 
to the extent that First Amendment law embodies special concerns 
about viewpoint discrimination—which it most emphatically does253—
that law also should reflect a serious concern about the use of 
viewpoint-expressive speech offered by prosecutors at trial. 
*   *   * 
 The bottom line is that First Amendment precedent and policy 
suggest that courts must take a contextual approach to proposed 
prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence, with the goal of carefully 
assessing the competing concerns presented by the facts of the 
particular case. As courts implement this idea, they will have to lay 
down more particularized rules that give meaningful protection to First 
Amendment values. The remainder of this Article considers what 
those rules should be. 
IV.  RULES FOR EVALUATING THE USE OF PAST-SPEECH EVIDENCE 
What rules should courts recognize to ensure that free-speech 
rights are adequately protected in past-speech evidence cases? This 
 
common law rulings); see also Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 864–65 (2017) 
(summarizing rules that provide “jurors with considerable assurance that after being discharged 
they will not be summoned to recount their deliberations . . . or annoyed by litigants seeking to 
challenge the verdict”). 
 251. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(describing viewpoint discrimination as “an egregious form of content discrimination”); accord, 
e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (noting that “restrictions [of 
speech rights] based on viewpoint are prohibited”).  
 252. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Holmes’s opinion in 
Abrams). 
 253. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1762 (2017) (Alito, J., for four members of the 
Court); id. at 1765, 1768 (Kennedy, J., for four other members of the Court). 
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Part suggests three separate rules that merit recognition: one 
concerning trial procedure, one concerning appellate procedure, and 
one concerning the substantive legal standard for testing admissibility. 
As to trial procedure, the key reform would mandate consideration of 
First Amendment objections to past-speech evidence in specialized 
hearings conducted outside the presence of the jury. As to appellate 
procedure, the courts should put in place a new standard of review—
far more exacting than the traditional “abuse of discretion” standard—
for assessing claims of trial court error in past-speech evidentiary 
rulings. Finally, as to the proper litmus test of admissibility, courts 
should take care to inquire whether the probative value of the 
objected-to evidence outweighs all the Free Speech Clause burdens its 
introduction would entail, including not only burdens of unfair 
prejudice, but also burdens of “fair prejudice” and chilling effects. 
A. Trial Procedure 
The Court has long insisted that trial judges use specialized 
procedural rules as they assess the admissibility of evidence that is 
potentially subject to exclusion pursuant to constitutional commands. 
In Jackson v. Denno,254 for example, the Court laid down specialized 
process requirements for dealing with objections to the evidentiary use 
of confessions, including a requirement that the trial court conduct “an 
adequate evidentiary hearing productive of reliable results.”255 
Taking much the same approach, the Court should insist that trial 
judges deploy two mechanisms of procedural care when they confront 
objections to past-speech evidence. First, trial judges should process 
these objections in carefully conducted proceedings that occur outside 
the presence of the jury.256 As with confessions, the hot-button 
character of protected-speech evidence suggests that juries should be 
shielded from any whiff of it unless and until the court deems it 
admissible.257 In addition, the risk exists that as lawyers discuss the 
admissibility of such evidence, the impact of that evidence on the minds 
of jurors is heightened—perhaps heightened greatly—even if the trial 
judge in the end decides to exclude it. In short, holding hearings away 
 
 254. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
 255. Id. at 394. 
 256. Accord Faulkner, supra note 5, at 21 (endorsing this approach); Quint, supra note 2, at 
1666 (same). 
 257. See, e.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951); United States v. Inman, 352 
F.2d 954, 956 (4th Cir. 1965).  
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from the jury would help reduce both factfinder confusion and 
prejudicial impact. This requirement also would steer the judicial mind 
in the direction of assessing past-speech evidence with the heightened 
measure of care it rightly deserves. 
Second, trial judges should have to set forth on the record their 
reasons for deciding to admit or exclude the challenged evidence.258 
The advantages created by taking this approach are apparent. 
Requiring a reasoned opinion would foster analytical discipline and 
discourage laxity in the decision-making process. It would remind trial 
judges that “indispensable”259 and “preferred”260 speech-related 
freedoms are at stake in the case, while also helping to facilitate well-
informed appellate review. Finally, mandating reason-giving would 
simply slow things down. And slowing down the making of trial court 
rulings on Free Speech Clause objections might well serve to 
counteract the tendency of judges to assume too readily—in much the 
same way as juries might do—that past-speech evidence should bear 
on the outcome of a trial simply because it has some form of relevance. 
B. Appellate Review 
No less than trial judges, appellate tribunals should adhere to 
special procedures in dealing with questions that concern past-speech 
evidence. In particular, appellate courts should abandon the highly 
deferential mode of review applicable to trial court rulings made under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.261 As explained above, the Court 
already has put in place rules that mandate de novo appellate review 
of trial court actions that endanger free-speech values,262 and the Court 
has taken the same approach in other constitutional contexts as well.263 
Of particular importance here, the Court has endorsed de novo review 
 
 258. Accord Dennis, supra note 4, at 34 (endorsing this approach); Faulkner, supra note 5, at 
21 (same); Quint, supra note 2, at 1666 (same).  
 259. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). 
 260. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). 
 261. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 
460, 471–72 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (indicating that, under Rule 403 review, “appellate courts must be 
‘extremely wary’ of second-guessing” trial court rulings (quoting Henderson v. George Wash. 
Univ., 449 F.3d 127, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).  
 262. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 263. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136 (1999) (plurality opinion) (declaring, in applying 
the Confrontation Clause, that “as with other fact-intensive, mixed questions of constitutional 
law . . . ‘[i]ndependent review is necessary’” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 
(1996))). 
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in public-concern-speech settings.264 Against this backdrop, it is not 
surprising that some scholars argue for de novo review of trial court 
decisions that authorize prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence in 
the face of First Amendment objections.265 
All things considered, another approach might prove to be even 
better. Under it, appellate courts would not engage in full-scale de 
novo review, but they still would steer clear, by a wide margin, of 
employing the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard. This style of 
review might be captured in terms such as “extremely confined” or 
“short-leash” deference. Such an approach would give trial courts 
some wiggle room to authorize prosecutorial use of past-speech 
evidence, free from all-out de novo second-guessing.266 And in doing 
so, short-leash deference might generate positive results for two 
reasons. First, it would reduce the risk of overdeterring the admission 
of proper past-speech evidence, particularly as trial judges anticipate 
the risk of reversal under specialized double-jeopardy rules that permit 
postverdict appeals only by defendants, and not by government 
prosecutors. 
Second, a rule of short-leash deference would take account of the 
practical challenges presented by requiring trial courts to engage in 
fact-specific balancing in past-speech-evidence cases. One difficulty 
baked into such a contextual balancing approach is that it inevitably 
will generate different assessments by different judges, including 
different assessments in the same case by trial courts and appellate 
tribunals. As a result, a regime of de novo review would inevitably 
produce full-blown retrials even in extremely close cases. Some 
analysts may see this outcome as salutary. In their view, the 
Constitution speaks with one voice to all courts, and the essential 
purpose of appellate review is to correct legal errors, especially in 
constitutional cases. On another view, however, the central goal of 
extending meaningful constitutional controls to past-speech-evidence 
 
 264. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1968). 
 265. Faulkner, supra note 5, at 21; Quint, supra note 2, at 1667; see also Anderson, supra note 
5, at 936, 940. 
 266. One can imagine a case, for example, in which the trial judge, because he is personally 
on the scene in pretrial proceedings, perceived a lessened risk of unfair prejudice in the use of the 
past-speech evidence than might otherwise exist because of the particular, case-specific unfolding 
of questions and answers in the jury-selection process. A rule of strict de novo review would 
preclude any consideration of such a factor; a rule of short leash deference, in contrast, would 
give such a factor some—but not determinative—significance.  
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cases is more systemic in nature. Seen from this vantage point, the key 
aim of devising limits in this field is to ensure that trial judges work 
with care to protect the free-expression values that prosecutorial 
proffers of past-speech evidence tend to threaten. Perhaps a no-
deference-at-all approach would work better than a short-leash 
deference rule to advance the cause of trial court attentiveness. But 
common sense suggests that such a minor difference in appellate 
techniques would not make much of a practical difference on this score. 
On the other hand, a short-leash-deference approach—by giving a 
modest benefit of the doubt to assessments made by trial judges—
would avoid the need for full-scale retrials in close-to-coin-flip cases, 
while taking account of whatever advantages trial judges have from 
being on the scene when the evidence is offered in real time for 
consideration by the jury. 
Finally, a rule of short-leash deference, precisely because it is short 
leashed, is unlikely to undercut the key aim of developing meaningful 
limits on the admission of relevant past-speech evidence. After all, the 
use of probing, rather than deeply deferential, scrutiny will allow 
appellate courts to develop over time a coherent body of doctrine that 
marks the boundaries of permissible trial court action. No less 
important, this form of highly probing (even if not de novo) review will 
amply empower appellate tribunals to police the oversights and 
missteps of any single trial judge in the handling of particular proffers 
of past-speech evidence. 
C. The Test of Admissibility 
The final question concerning the judicial fashioning of past-
speech-evidence doctrine is the most central of all: When a court 
encounters a First Amendment challenge to the use of such evidence, 
what governing standard should it apply in ruling on its admissibility? 
Many answers to this question are possible. Courts could, for example, 
apply a rule of automatic exclusion once they decide that public-
concern speech is at issue.267 Such an approach, however, would run 
headlong into the Court’s ruling in Haupt, as well as the Court’s 
pronouncements in Dawson and Mitchell.268 
 
 267. See, e.g., Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 123, at 894–95 (suggesting that 
protected past-speech evidence should automatically be excluded in conspiracy prosecutions).  
 268. Such an inflexible approach also would not fit together well with the contextual balancing 
framework set forth and defended in the public-concern-speech cases typified by Connick. See 
supra notes 232–42 and accompanying text. 
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Another possibility would be to embrace a rule of near-automatic 
exclusion—for example, a rule that permits trial courts to admit past-
speech evidence only in “extraordinary circumstances.”269 Rules of this 
kind have a place in constitutional law.270 Indeed, the discourse of strict 
scrutiny—put to work in both Humanitarian Law Project and 
Sherbert—offers support for applying such an approach here. 
Adopting a rule of near-automatic exclusion, however, would raise a 
variety of problems. To begin with, neither the direct-in-effect-burden 
line of decisions typified by Humanitarian Law Project nor the 
compulsory-exemption rule of Sherbert fits perfectly together with 
past-speech-evidence cases.271 In addition, such an approach would 
raise tensions with both the Court’s endorsement of the use of past-
speech evidence in Haupt and its rejection of a comparable expression-
protective standard for public-concern-speech cases in Connick.272 
Most important, such a methodology would tip the balance heavily 
against the use of past-speech evidence—sometimes, highly relevant 
past-speech evidence—notwithstanding strong policies that support 
not only acquittal of the innocent but also conviction of the guilty.273 
In sum, rules of automatic or near-automatic exclusion would 
unduly favor defendants and disfavor government prosecutors. As a 
result, courts might take exactly the opposite approach by holding that 
relevant past-speech evidence is never subject to First Amendment 
objections or that it is excludable in only “rare” or “extraordinary” 
instances. These approaches, however, would not take fair account of 
First Amendment freedoms rightly recognized by the Court as both 
“precious” and “vulnerable”274—just as surely as rules of automatic or 
 
 269. Courts could define “extraordinary circumstances” to reference either the distinctly high 
probative value of the evidence, the distinctly high importance of ensuring conviction of the guilty, 
or both. Consider, for example, the hypothetical bombing case put forward in the Introduction. 
Consider also a recorded statement made the day before the bombing in which the defendant 
declared, “This government is so terrible I could blow up a building.” Such a near-in-time, 
focused, and incontrovertible statement, even if addressing a matter of public concern, might well 
be admissible under such an “extraordinary circumstances” test. 
 270. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) (recognizing a 
“virtually per se rule of invalidity” in facial-discrimination dormant Commerce Clause cases). 
 271. See supra notes 161–72 and accompanying text (discussing Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)); supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)) . 
 272. See supra notes 24–35 (discussing Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 642 (1947)); supra 
notes 232–42 and accompanying text (discussing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)). 
 273. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–09 (1974) (emphasizing the “twofold” purpose 
of the criminal justice system, including that “guilt shall not escape” (citation omitted)). 
 274. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
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near-automatic exclusion would not take fair account of countervailing 
societal interests. Among other things, these pro-prosecution 
standards would, as seen above, create discordance with modern 
precedents that pointedly call for “broad protection” of speech on 
matters of public concern.275 Indeed, a rare-cases-only approach would 
not only fail to provide such speech with “broad protection”; it would 
render First Amendment scrutiny in this context little more than an 
empty shell. 
One might challenge this position by asserting that there is a 
special justification for endorsing a no-objections-ever or an 
extraordinary-cases-only prosecutor-friendly approach. The argument 
is that trial judges can deal with the problems presented by past-speech 
proof by delivering thoughtful limiting instructions, thereby reducing 
the danger of the jury’s improper use of the problematic evidence. As 
discussed above, however, there are built-in difficulties with this 
approach due to the limited effectiveness of such instructions.276 In 
addition, there is a special problem with relying on cautionary 
instructions to deal with past-speech evidence because those 
instructions, by their very nature, cannot ameliorate burdens on 
expression that stem from either “fair prejudice” or chilling effects. 
The whole point of such instructions, after all, is to invite juries to 
consider past-speech evidence, while avoiding only the unfairly 
prejudicial use of such evidence in the process of deliberating in the 
particular case. 
Given the difficulties raised by moving to either polar position—
that is, by embracing, on the one hand, an overwhelmingly pro-
government or, on the other hand, an overwhelmingly pro-defendant 
approach to admissibility—some analysts have tried to steer a middle 
course. One synthesis would require judges to focus on the type of past-
speech evidence offered by the prosecution. Courts, for example, might 
declare that past speech that embodies art, such as rap music, enjoys 
categorical, or nearly categorical, protection from prosecutorial use as 
evidence.277 Because such an approach would give more favorable 
 
 275. See supra notes 73–91 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 277. See, e.g., Michael Gregory, Murder Was the Case That They Gave Me: Defendant’s Rap 
Lyrics As Evidence in a Criminal Trial, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 329, 356 (2016) (arguing that rap 
lyrics should not be admissible unless the lyrics virtually “parallel the crime alleged”); Powell, 
supra note 122, at 523 (noting that one “solution would be to [exclude] defendants’ rap 
lyrics . . . unless they make some specific reference to a crime that only a guilty party would know 
about”); id. at 524–25 (advocating “a per se ban on rap lyrics in criminal proceedings” because of 
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treatment to some speech than other speech based on content, 
however, it would be hard to square with the Court’s often-expressed 
aversion to content-based categorizations in the regulation of 
protected expression.278 
Perhaps in an effort to dodge this problem, Professor Quint floats 
the idea that speech-related evidence might be grouped into three 
categories, based not so much on the content of expression as on its 
form. According to this approach, past-speech evidence would be 
subject to a tripartite division, ranging from least protected to most 
protected, depending on whether it involves (1) activity in the form of 
actual statements by the defendant (for example, a profession like “I 
endorse Nazism.”); (2) activity in the form of expressive association by 
the defendant (for example, membership in the Nazi Party); and (3) 
activity in the form of taking in others’ expressive work (for example, 
attendance of a Nazi-sponsored rally or reading Mein Kampf).279 This 
way of thinking about past-speech evidence has some value, and courts 
should pay it heed as they engage in balancing in this set of cases. In 
the end, however, even Professor Quint does not advocate adoption of 
three distinct legal tests for each of these forms of speech-related 
activity. And wisely so. As Justice Kagan once observed, modern First 
Amendment law has spawned “technical, complex classificatory 
schemes” under which “categories have multiplied” and “distinctions 
grown increasingly fine.”280 To a large extent, this building out of free-
speech doctrine reflects the inevitably rich complexities of life. With 
regard to past-speech evidence, however, there is little reason to 
conclude that endorsing a three-category analytical approach would be 
worth the candle. Even without creating rigid and confining analytical 
 
“the potential chilling effect on the genre, accompanied by the fact that lyrics will not make or 
break the prosecution’s case”); see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 902, 942–43 (proposing a more 
restrictive framework for the admission of evidence, under which “[t]he showing of relevancy 
should be more rigorous,” for cases involving proof relating to the defendant’s taste in music or 
other entertainment). 
 278. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (noting that content-based laws 
are “presumptively unconstitutional”). 
 279. Quint, supra note 2, at 1668–76. Some judges have moved, if haltingly, in this direction. 
See, e.g., Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by United States 
v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Curtin, 489 F.3d at 963 (Kleinfeld, C.J., 
concurring) (distinguishing the case at hand from Haupt because Haupt involved “what a 
defendant said . . . not what he merely read”); Anderson, supra note 5, at 937 (arguing for closer 
judicial scrutiny of speech “consumption” evidence because mere “[c]uriosity may drive us to try 
different materials”). 
 280. Kagan, supra note 72, at 515. 
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categories, after all, courts can take account of these form-of-speech 
considerations. 
Another middle-course approach for past-speech-evidence cases 
would constitutionalize the Rule 403 standard, which balances 
probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice in federal 
proceedings. In other words, this nonconstitutional rule set forth in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence would morph into a constitutional rule 
applicable in all federal and state prosecutions as a matter of 
entrenched First Amendment doctrine.281 One problem with this 
proposal is that Rule 403 was neither formulated to deal specifically 
with past-speech evidence nor constructed in an effort to restate Free 
Speech Clause limits.282 Even more important, this magical 
transformation of Rule 403 would put in place a First Amendment limit 
that is too lax. In particular, Rule 403 specifies that unfair prejudice 
must “substantially outweigh” probative value for exclusion to occur, 
and courts have emphasized this admission-friendly phrasing in 
overruling objections to speech-related proof.283 Thus, in the real 
world, few Rule 403 motions to exclude relevant evidence are 
granted.284 Indeed, the obstacles faced by defendants who assert Rule 
403 objections are far-reaching, in part because the burden of justifying 
exclusion rests squarely on the objecting party,285 because that burden 
is a heavy one,286 and because discharging it requires an all-out focus 
 
 281. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (relying on the “firm[]” application of FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(b) and 26(c) to protect First Amendment interests implicated by civil discovery of 
newsroom thought processes in defamation cases). 
 282. Prejudice-related questions, for example, could arise under Rule 403 if the prosecution’s 
proof touched upon a defendant’s past liaisons with prostitutes. Such evidence, however, has 
nothing to do with past speech, speech-related prejudice concerns, or speech-related chilling 
effects. 
 283. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The language of 
this rule tilts . . . toward the admission of evidence in close cases.”). 
 284. As one commentator put the point, “Many Prayers Are Heard, Few Are Answered.” 
Michael H. Graham, Relevance, Fed. R. Evid. 401, and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence, Fed. 
R. Evid. 403: “Many Prayers Are Heard, Few Are Answered,” 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1080, 1080 
(Nov.–Dec. 2009). 
 285. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that Rule 403 
“creates a presumption of admissibility” (citation omitted)); Leah Tabbert, Note, Maximizing the 
Min-Max Test: A Proposal to Unify the Framework for Rule 403 Decisions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
2217, 2224 (2016) (same). 
 286. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:12 
(4th ed. 2013) (“[T]he power to exclude evidence under Rule 403 should be sparingly exercised. 
The tenor of the language of Rule 403 supports this conclusion, since it contemplates admitting 
rather than excluding evidence when probative worth seems equally balanced against dangers like 
prejudice and confusion of the issues.” (citation omitted)); David Crump, On the Uses of 
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only on problems of unfair prejudice.287 For these reasons, the Rule 403 
standard is likely to prove so feckless in practice that it would not 
functionally differ from an extraordinary-cases-only rule of 
inadmissibility.288 In sum, any properly operationalized First 
Amendment standard of exclusion needs to have a much stronger 
backbone than that of Rule 403. 
Professor Quint attempts to work through these challenges by 
proposing a constitutional rule that would “reverse[] the ordinary test” 
of admissibility embodied in Rule 403.289 In other words, judges would 
have to exclude past-speech evidence “unless the government can 
establish that the probative value of the evidence substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial dangers.”290 There is something to be said for 
Professor Quint’s proposed methodology; at the least, it would afford 
past speech a meaningful measure of judicial protection.291 But this 
approach suffers from problems of its own. To begin with, the starting 
point for Professor Quint’s reverse-403 presumption lies in the text of 
Rule 403, and there is—as noted earlier—no apparent reason why a 
constitutional limit should find its origins in this nonconstitutional rule 
of evidence law. Another difficulty with this reverse-403 presumption 
is that it seems to rest on too circumscribed a view of “prejudice” 
because Rule 403 focuses on a factfinder’s use of the evidence for 
impermissible purposes—to infer guilt, for example, because 
defendants are bad people, troublemakers, oddballs, or irritants.292 As 
 
Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (“Rule 403 . . . is biased in favor of 
admissibility.”); Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking”, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 880 (2002) (“The word ‘substantially’ tilts the balance of Rule 403 toward 
admissibility.”). 
 287. See infra notes 292–96. 
 288. See, e.g., Faulkner, supra note 5, at 6 (deeming Rule 403 review “constitutionally 
insufficient,” in part, because “it weights the balancing process towards . . . admission”); id. at 24 
(adding that even reforming Rule 403’s test to equalize the roles of probative value and prejudicial 
effect would “not provide sufficient protection to First Amendment rights”).  
 289. Quint, supra note 2, at 1662. 
 290. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 291. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5195, at 313 (2009 Supp.) (characterizing as “persuasively argued” Quint’s 
position that “the First Amendment imposes restrictions on the use of political speech and 
associations in criminal prosecutions”). 
 292. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note (indicating that “prejudice” is “[u]nfair” 
if it has “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis”); Old Chief v. United 
States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (defining “unfair prejudice” as concerning dangers that the 
factfinder might be “lure[d] . . . into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to 
the offense charged”). But see Imwinkelried, supra note 123, at 888–93 (suggesting that judges 
may consider extrinsic social policies in making Rule 403 admissibility determinations). 
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previously demonstrated, however, the use of past-speech evidence 
burdens First Amendment rights for reasons that reach well beyond 
this single form of prejudicial effect.293 The underlying problem is that 
the reverse-403-presumption test sharply differentiates between “fair” 
and “unfair” uses of evidence in that Rule 403, by its terms, focuses 
only on the risk of “unfair prejudice.”294 Even “fair” prejudice, 
however, gives rise to a burden that should weigh in the balance when 
speech on matters of public concern is at issue.295 So, too, should 
systemic concerns about chilling effects.296 
Ultimately, composing the precise wording of a legal formula for 
gauging the admissibility of relevant past-speech evidence is less 
important than embracing the basic principle that the First 
Amendment requires courts to evaluate the evidentiary use of such 
speech in a meaningful way. In the picture, too, is the fact that the 
interests of the government and of the defendant will inevitably clash 
in these cases in a wide-ranging and unpredictable variety of ways. 
With these points in mind, perhaps the best course is to avoid stating 
any operative limit in the technical jargon of the law—such as by laying 
down a formula that speaks about a “presumption”297 or (worse yet) 
the “reverse” of a preexisting presumption298 or that otherwise makes 
use of the lawyerly phraseology of Rule 403. Courts also would do well 
to eschew metaphorical flourishes that allude, for example, to “placing 
a thumb on the prejudice and confusion side of the scale.”299 Instead, 
the best approach—because it is the most comprehensive and direct—
would articulate the controlling proposition in unadorned terminology. 
Such a formulation might read something like this: 
When an objection is made to proffered evidence that involves speech 
on a matter of public concern, the court must balance with care the 
relevance of the evidence against the threatened burden on First 
Amendment rights. In doing so, the court must take full account of 
the constitutional centrality of those rights and recognize that the 
 
 293. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 294. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 341 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing this 
point), vacated by Hammoud v. United States, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005).  
 295. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra Part II.C. 
 297. Faulkner, supra note 5, at 6, 21 (deeming past-speech evidence “presumptively 
prejudicial”); accord Donohue, supra note 110, at 233. 
 298. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 299. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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threatened burden on them reaches beyond the risk of unfair 
prejudice to the objecting party in the factfinding process.300 
Other formulations along these lines can be, and no doubt will be, 
framed by judges and commentators.301 It bears emphasis, however, 
that the development of the law in this area will depend most of all on 
the contextual adjudication of concrete disputes on a case-by-case 
basis, regardless of any legal “test” that courts lay down to guide the 
balancing process. As courts navigate this process, they must attend not 
only to the immediate pressures to admit relevant evidence, but also to 
the enduring and systemic concerns underlying the First Amendment. 
D. Applications 
Limitations of time and space preclude a detailed treatment in this 
Article of how these principles might operate in practice. As it turns 
out, however, much good work along these lines already exists. 
Professor Andrea L. Dennis, for example, has thoughtfully grappled 
with the special problems presented by rap-music evidence.302 Robert 
P. Faulkner has focused, in a similar fashion, on the intersection of 
Noerr-Pennington principles and evidence law.303 Professor Quint’s 
pathbreaking article has directed attention to past-speech evidence in 
the form of high-octane political dissent.304 Courts should take care to 
consider these helpful treatments as they work their way through past-
speech-evidence cases. 
Courts also should pay attention to accepted paradigms and well-
reasoned precedents. In United States v. Ring,305 for example, the 
Government offered—and the court admitted—evidence of the 
 
 300. For a similar suggestion, see Nickerson, supra note 6, at 877 (requiring “a showing more 
demanding than mere relevance” to gain court-ordered disclosure of speech-related evidence); 
see also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of 
the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2011) (advocating a case-specific “pragmatic 
balancing” approach for assessing the constitutionality of government reliance on protected 
speech activities to initiate criminal investigations; and collecting supportive authority for this 
position). 
 301. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 4, at 30–31 (embracing a “balanced approach” under which 
courts would focus on the “unfairly prejudicial nature” of rap lyrics); id. at 33 (adding that 
“[j]udges should approach the admissibility determination from” the “vantage point . . . of the 
lyricist”). 
 302. See generally id. (discussing this issue at length). 
 303. See Faulkner, supra note 5, at 29–35.  
 304. See generally Quint, supra note 2 (examining the introduction of evidence of membership 
in the Communist Party by the Government in the Rosenberg trial). 
 305. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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defendant’s past-speech activity in the form of campaign 
contributions.306 This evidence was offered to show that he used such 
contributions not as bribes, but as a stepping stone to secure access to 
officeholders whom he later would try to bribe.307 This ruling is 
defensible, but only because the evidence concerned contributions 
made to candidates of a mainstream party. If the proof showed, for 
example, that the defendant had channeled funds to Nazi Party 
candidates, so as to gain access to their officeholder friends, a very 
different case would be presented, even though the relevance of the 
past-expression evidence in each case might seem to be the same. In 
terms of the risk of prejudice, after all, it is one thing to support the 
campaigns of Republicans and Democrats. It is quite another thing to 
send money to Nazis. 
Courts also should take care to consider dividing up proffered 
past-speech evidence into separate component parts. It might well be, 
for example, that a trial judge can and should admit evidence of a 
defendant’s gang membership, together with proof of the gang’s 
commitment to cross-gang killings, to establish the motive for an 
alleged murder.308 But the same judge might simultaneously exclude 
proffered evidence of the defendant’s writing of gang-related rap lyrics 
that both embody artistic social commentary and tend to show the 
defendant’s motive only in a tenuous way. Past-speech evidence is 
oftentimes divisible in this way. Trial judges should be attentive to that 
fact, looking for chances to break apart clusters of past-speech 
evidence, admitting portions of it that are highly relevant, but 
excluding portions that have only marginally probative value. 
Revisiting the first paragraph of this Article brings into focus a 
recurring problem raised by past-speech evidence—that is, the 
problem of how to evaluate such evidence when it is offered to prove 
a defendant’s state of mind. At the trial of Julius Rosenberg, for 
example, prosecutors presented evidence that the defendant had 
expressed a preference for the Communist system of government. 
Their purpose in offering this evidence was to help prove that the 
defendant had in fact passed secret information to the Soviets by 
 
 306. Id. at 472–74. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Notably, the court might reason either that membership in a murderous gang is not a 
matter of public concern or, alternatively, that the relevance of such evidence outweighs the risk 
of prejudice it poses. 
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showing the jury that he had a motive for doing so.309 Proof of a 
preference for one form of government over another, however, links 
up only in the loosest way with committing acts of espionage,310 and the 
acute risk of unfair prejudice in such a case—which occurred at the 
height of the Red Scare—is not hard to see.311 
In telling contrast, the Court in Haupt dealt with past-speech 
evidence offered for a very different purpose. There, the prosecution 
did not tender the defendant’s prior statements merely to prove an 
underlying motive, so as to suggest circumstantially that the defendant 
engaged in the actus reus of the offense. Instead, the prosecution 
offered the proof to establish (probably in the only way possible) a 
mens rea element fixed by the statutory prohibition itself—namely, 
that the defendant acted with a specific intent to aid the enemy.312 Put 
another way, Julius Rosenberg’s past speech was used to prove through 
inference that certain conduct had occurred, while Haupt’s past speech 
was used to prove directly his state of mind, a statutory element. In 
addition, the evidence in Haupt involved much more than an expressed 
preference for one form of government over another; indeed, the 
father’s declaration that he would kill his son if he fought against 
Germany signaled an intense and focused enmity that reached far 
beyond simply endorsing an unpopular point of view.313 For these 
reasons, the Court’s ruling in Haupt is reconcilable with the mode of 
analysis put forward in this Article. On the other hand, there is good 
reason to conclude that the Second Circuit’s ruling in Rosenberg did 
not take fair account of the free-speech values at stake in the case.314 
 
 309. Quint, supra note 2, at 1634–36. 
 310. Id. at 1669. 
 311. Id. at 1639 (noting the “grave dangers of prejudice” that arose because the Rosenbergs’ 
trial came “in the heart of the Cold War period”). 
 312. See generally supra notes 24–29. The charged crime of treason included a specific-intent 
element with regard to aiding the enemy. See supra note 27. Particularly in a treason case such as 
Haupt—where another plausible motive (here, parental love) is clearly in the picture—it typically 
will be very difficult to prove the defendant’s entirely inner mental state without any resort to 
past expressions of the defendant’s thinking.  
 313. See supra note 29. Most of us, for example, want very much for skilled players on our 
sports teams not to shift allegiances to a despised rival. But few of us would find reason to declare 
that we would kill those players in the event that they choose to do so. 
 314. One set of cases that highlights the distinction between background-motive and intent-
element inquiries involves antidiscrimination laws. In these cases, plaintiffs and prosecutors seek 
to use past-speech evidence to prove a prohibited discriminatory mental state as part of a criminal 
or civil proceeding. The laws that give rise to such cases require proof of some adverse action—
for example, a failure to hire, a firing, a battery, or a killing—taken by the defendant with the 
specific intent to act because of the victim’s race, gender, or other legally specified personal 
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Even precedents that do not involve evidentiary issues might 
prove useful to courts as they undertake context-sensitive balancing in 
past-speech-evidence cases. In Connick, for example, the Court rightly 
emphasized that judges should distinguish between speech that lies at 
the heart of the First Amendment and speech that travels near the 
outer edges of the public-concern concept.315 Other considerations—
such as the recency of the speech,316 its isolated character,317 its 
distinctive potential for creating prejudicial effects,318 its packaging in 
forms that are “frequently exaggerated or polemical,”319 and its 
immediate or more attenuated relevance to contested factual 
 
characteristic. See generally United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 508 (5th Cir. 2014) (collecting 
illustrative attempted uses of past-speech evidence in antidiscrimination cases). Many of these 
cases involve the evidentiary use of racist or sexist speech that has occurred during the actual 
course of a discrete prohibited action—as when, for example, a defendant screams racial slurs 
while engaging in a violent assault. Not surprisingly, such evidence is routinely admitted because 
it involves, in the most focused way, the defendant’s own indication of the requisite wrongful 
intent as to the very act in question. In other cases, forms of past-speech proof that are less directly 
connected to the act in question—such as the defendant’s past expression of racist views—may 
be allowed into evidence if they, too, are relevant to show a wrongful animus that is an element 
of the legal prohibition. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (observing 
that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an employment 
decision challenged under an antidiscrimination law). In essence, that is what happened in Haupt, 
although the statute at issue in that case was not an antidiscrimination law. As Professor Quint 
explains, use of past-speech evidence to prove a statutorily required wrongful intent is typically 
far less problematic than the use of such speech, as in the Rosenberg case, to show an underlying 
motive for the purpose of proving that the defendant engaged in actions he denies having taken. 
Why? Because “fewer inferential steps are necessary” to prove an illicit “intent” directly from the 
defendant’s speech. On the other hand, indirectly proving the defendant’s commission of an act 
by using speech to establish an underlying motive involves nothing more than an effort to offer 
only one piece of (often highly tenuous) circumstantial evidence to establish the actus reus of the 
offense. Quint, supra note 2, at 1670–71. Moreover, as suggested in the discussion of Haupt in the 
text, “speech is often the only . . . evidence bearing on the question of intent.” Id. To say the least, 
the same is not true with respect to the question whether the defendant committed the actus reus 
of the crime charged. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 935–36 (sharply distinguishing 
between cases in which the statute establishes as an element a particular form of wrongful intent 
and cases in which the prosecutor seeks only to prove a motive, which is not an element of the 
crime charged, so as to support the inference that the defendant engaged in a particular action in 
which the defendant denies having been involved).  
 315. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) (suggesting greater likelihood of success 
in asserting a First Amendment claim “if the employee’s speech more substantially involved 
matters of public concern”). 
 316. See Dennis, supra note 4, at 33. 
 317. See id. 
 318. See id. 
 319. Quint, supra note 2, at 1669; see also Dennis, supra note 4, at 25 (questioning the 
recurring admission of rap-music evidence because rappers “are akin to fiction writers”). 
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issues320—also should weigh in the decisional balance.321 The key point 
is that courts must approach the balancing process with 
thoughtfulness—thoughtfulness that should increase if, as suggested 
earlier, they must craft case-specific justifications for their rulings only 
after considering evidentiary objections in focused hearings conducted 
outside the presence of the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted by a leading authority on the subject, “Writers have 
sometimes urged courts to use . . . the First Amendment to limit the 
use of evidence. Judges do not seem enthusiastic about doing this.”322 
This assertion is both true and troubling. In declining to scrutinize past-
speech evidence with care, lower courts have both overread key 
Supreme Court precedents and undervalued the free-speech interests 
these cases present. Of particular importance, those courts have paid 
too little attention to modern developments in the First Amendment 
field, particularly case law that aggressively protects speech on matters 
of public concern and requires courts to evaluate thoughtfully as-
applied challenges to speech-impairing generally applicable laws. This 
Article points the way to an improved approach. The establishment of 
meaningful, but nonburdensome, procedural requirements would 
foster decision-making care as judges assess past-speech evidentiary 
objections. And a vitalized substantive rule of exclusion—one that 
reaches well beyond Rule 403 by taking meaningful account of all the 
burdens imposed on free-speech values by the use of such evidence—
would help ensure that courts, in this set of cases, afford our most 
fundamental liberties their fair due. 
 
 320. Dennis, supra note 4, at 33 (focusing on the close connectivity of prior-speech evidence 
to, for example, a particular crime-connected modus operandi); Quint, supra note 2, at 1670–71 
(distinguishing “general political views from views of greater specificity bearing on the alleged 
offense[s]”); see also id. at 1671 n.169 (discussing, in this vein, specificity-laden past speech, such 
as an address calling on listeners to block traffic on a bridge, offered to show the speaker’s 
intentional engagement in that behavior); id. at 1674 (noting that inferring intent from 
membership in a political group is a logically weak connection). 
 321. Quint, supra note 2, at 1676. Another relevant factor might be the extent to which the 
defendant has “opened the door” to an investigation of such matters as his political beliefs 
through the offering of his own evidence or arguments in the case.  
 322. 22A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5195 (4th ed. 2014) (citations omitted). 
